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I.

INTRODUCTION

The prison model of punishment is overdue for
1
2
deconstruction or at least a major overhaul. Indeed, the process
† Director of Legal Information Services, New York State Defenders
Association. J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John's
University, 1994; B.A., summa cum laude, St. John's University, 1981. I would like to
thank Leah Graf for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See, e.g., Yves Bourque, Prison Abolition, 1 J. PRISONERS ON PRISONS 1 (1988)
(describing experiences in the Canadian prison system). “Prisons, no matter how
‘beautiful’ we make them, no matter how ‘humane’ we would have them, no
matter how ‘rehabilitative’ we devise them, will always be horror houses where
public vengeance is administered, cruelly and destructively, on persons who are
the most vulnerable and defenseless of our society.” Id.; Louis X. Holloway, Prison
Abolition or Destruction Is a Must!, 45 MISS. L.J. 757, 758 (1974) (“Even if all forms of
racism and inhumanity could be eliminated from the prison systems, the problems
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of sentencing offenders is out of line with the Constitution because
it fails to recognize the role of prison conditions as an element of
punishment. Every sentence to a term of years pronounced by a
judge is incomplete. The length of time to be served is imposed
without any mention or consideration of the conditions of
confinement. By virtue of their roles, the prosecutor, judge, and
defense counsel are not concerned with the most important facet
of a prison sentence, the “cruel” nature of incarcerative
punishment. Prosecutors formulate sentence recommendations in
the blind, defendants make ill-informed decisions about whether to
accept plea bargains, judges impose punishments without
understanding their full import, and jurors are completely cut out
of the loop. It is a game of poker, where no player can see their
cards and the accused must bet everything without knowing all the
risks.
Presently, those conditions are typically exposed and defined
in Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners. And when
these problems are left unattended they can reach crisis
proportions. Mandatory disclosure of prison conditions would give
prosecutors more discretion in the charging decision and
sentencing recommendation; defense lawyers the opportunity to
present mitigating evidence related to alternatives to incarceration,
sentence reduction, or institutional classification; and judges the
information needed to customize punishment for the individual in
3
the interests of justice. Moreover, a policy that acknowledges
would only be half solved.”).
2. See Rebecca McLennan, When Felons Were Human, ON HUM. (Aug. 16,
2011), http://onthehuman.org/2011/08/when-felons-were-human/ (“Americans
haven’t always perceived prisoners and convicts as exceptional categories of
human or even an exceptional category of citizen, undeserving of most or all
rights. Both the Progressive Era’s prison reform movement and the prisoner rights
movements of the 1950s and ‘60s attracted considerable popular support—so
much so, that many states actually embarked on ‘decarceration’ programs in the
1960s and early 1970s (leading at least one prominent sociologist to predict in
1977 that prisons might soon be a thing of the past).”). See generally Carol Steiker,
Introduction, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011) (describing current scholarly thinking
about the problem of mass incarceration and possible solutions in a series of
articles published in Symposium, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit
Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu
/osjcl/issues.php?ID=35).
3. See Alice G. Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV.
727, 748 (2009) (“When the drafters of the new [Model Penal] Code call for
‘evidence-based penology’ and for more rigorous empirical research, perhaps they
hope that the facts will speak for themselves. Perhaps the hope is that once people
see how much sentences cost, and how little they apparently deter, the only
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prison conditions in sentencing practices might serve to stem the
4
tide of prison inflation. Acknowledgment of prison conditions was
the motivation behind a newly enacted legislative scheme in
California designed to reduce its state prison population and
thereby address the unconstitutional conditions within.
Part I of this article begins with a review of the state of
incarceration as viewed through the lens of prison populations.
Then in Part II, the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Brown
v. Plata is explored, along with an analysis of its justifications for
upholding a mass release order to remedy the inadequate medical
and mental health facilities in an overcrowded state prison system.
Part III describes California’s novel choice of realignment
legislation to comply with this order as a legislative approach that
does not result in mass release but rather a mass redirection of
incoming offenders away from state prisons and into the local
corrections system. The potential for criminal sentencing reform
inspired by the Court’s decision and the state’s realignment policy
are further explored in Part IV, which examines past and present
efforts to fine-tune incarcerative sentencing outcomes mindful of
the conditions of confinement. Finally, additional suggestions for
uncovering and taking into account the conditions of confinement
as an aid to reform are considered at different points along the
adjudication spectrum.
II. BY THE NUMBERS
With more than 2 million men, women, and juveniles behind
bars, the prison community is tantamount to a small country or a
5
large city. The enormity of the problems created by prison life has
rational response will be to reduce the length of prison sentences and look for
other alternatives.”).
4. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING
AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION, 2007–2011 25–26 (2007)[hereinafter PUBLIC
SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING] , available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/uploadedFiles/Public%20Safety%20Public%20Spending.pdf
(“The
profiles
highlight states that have broadened their approaches to criminal justice, making
prisons one item on a larger menu of options for dealing with the wide spectrum
of criminal behavior.”).
5. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
2010, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 tbl.2 (2011), available
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (providing the adult correctional
system populations in 2010: Probation, 4,055,514; Parole, 840,676; Prison,
1,518,104; Local Jail 748,728; Multiple statuses (e.g., jail and probation) 86,823;
Total 7,076,200); see also PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING, supra note 4, at ii
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drawn the attention of government and civic leaders who joined to
6
form the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons.
This nonpartisan entity investigated the “dangerous conditions of
confinement—violence, poor medical and mental health care, and
inappropriate segregation—that can also endanger the public; the
challenges facing labor and management; weak oversight of
correctional facilities; and serious flaws in available data about
7
violence and abuse in prisons and jails .” Overcrowding, solitary
confinement, sexual abuse, mistreatment, inadequate medical care,
assault, and a myriad of other deprivations are scarcely being
8
addressed by legislative enactments and responsible oversight.
Until this changes, the burden will continue to fall to the courts to
resolve these issues through prison litigation.
The Eighth Amendment guarantees that no one shall be
9
subject to cruel and unusual punishment. Cruel and unusual
punishment cannot be defined based on a locale or the perceived
culpability of the accused: neither should the conditions of
confinement be selectively defined based on parochial notions of
10
Justice should be justice
retribution, economics, or politics.
11
everywhere, and not reliant on the luck of the draw. Thus the
(“[S]tate and federal prisons will swell by more than 192,000 inmates over the next
five years.”).
6. See Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, Mission, VERA INST.
JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/commission-safety-and-abuse-americas-prisons
/#/project/commission-safety-and-abuse-americas-prisons/mission (last visited
Mar. 27, 2012) (including access to hearing transcripts, expert testimony, and the
Confronting Confinement 2006 final report).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Office of Justice Programs, Prison Rape Elimination Act Publications
and Resources, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs
/prisonrapeelimination.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (containing text of act,
reports on its implementation, statistical studies, and related resources).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). See
generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3D 111 (1973).
10. Cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The Court’s precedents on the rights of prisoners rest on the
implicit (and erroneous) presumption that the Constitution contains an implicit
definition of incarceration. This is manifestly not the case, and, in my view, States
are free to define and redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment,
to encompass various types of deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are
consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Under this view, the Court’s precedents on
prisoner ‘rights’ bear some reexamination.”).
11. See, e.g., John Wisely, Drunken-Driving Penalties Could Depend on Your
Location, USA TODAY (July 28, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news
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laws that decide which offenders go to state prison or local jail, or
are eligible for alternatives to incarceration or early release, should
be informed by data about the effects that current crime policies
are having on the prison population and the conditions within.
Full disclosure of jail and prison conditions can become part of a
scheme to inform judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
defendants who must make choices about the course of criminal
litigation.
The numerically based incarcerative sentence is
inextricably linked to the ensuing punishment and hazards of
prison life.
Our Constitution is a fountainhead of fairness that has
inspired the legal progress of nations across the world since its
12
And yet, no country following this blueprint has
creation.
experienced the colossal rise in incarceration that has occurred in
13
America. Out of a total population of about 309 million people,
the United States imprisons nearly 2.3 million—representing more
14
than one-fifth of the world’s prison population. It’s a creeping
decimal point that bears no relation to changes in crime rates,
improvements in controlling human behavior, increases in quality
of life, or greater safety for citizens. This is in addition to the other
15
precincts of confinement including noncitizen detention, mental
health post release commitments pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act
16
17
Unlike the
and similar state statutes, and pretrial detention.
/nation/2011-07-28-drunken-driving-first-offense-sentencing_n.htm
(“Different
courts use different means, from fines, probation, education classes and jail time,
and the court a driver ends up in often is a big factor in the type of punishment
handed down.”). See generally Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality
in the States, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971569.
12. See generally Albert P. Blaustein, Our Most Important Export: The Influence of
the United States Constitution Abroad, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 15 (1987).
13. See USA Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov
/qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Jan. 17, 2012).
14. See GLAZE, supra note 5, at 3 tbl.1 (stating that the 2010 jail and prison
population estimate was 2,266,800); ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES,
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), available at
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf.
15. According to the federal government, 87,235 noncitizens were held in
federal and state facilities in 2008. See HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—
STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.20 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content
/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (stating the reported number of non-U.S. citizens held in
state or federal prisons, by gender, region, and jurisdiction from June 30, 2007 to
June 30, 2008).
16. See Nina Totenberg, Federal Prisoners Kept Beyond Their Sentences, NPR (Jan.
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national debt ceiling, there is no limit to the maximum number of
persons who might be incarcerated.
The reasons for the phenomenal growth of the number of
incarcerated persons, not to mention parolees and probationers,
18
are changes in public policy and crime control. When Senator
Jim Webb presided over the Joint Economic Committee hearing on
mass incarceration, he observed: “The growth in the prison
population is only nominally related to crime rates. . . . [I]n the
Washington Post, the deputy director of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics stated that ‘the growth [in the incarceration rate] wasn’t
19
really about increas[ed] crime but how we chose to respond to crime.’”
This is the fundamental point: prison overpopulation is society’s
current response to maintaining law and order.
Crime statistics have long been touted as the principle
20
justification behind longer sentences and prison bond issues.
Still, prison building and hence imprisonment of offenders bears
21
Of all the factors that
little or no relation to crime rates.
12, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122452485.
17. See MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.1.1 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf (stating the
figures for suspects arrested for federal offenses and booked by U.S. Marshals
Service, by offense, from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008).
18. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 33–34 (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing the shift away from the rehabilitative model to a “just deserts” theory of
punishment).
19. See Mass Incarceration in the United States: At What Cost?: Hearing Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb, Member,
Joint Econ. Comm.) http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id
=d4b29f7b-bb6b-4f88-be56-f7d1649b5c82 (emphasis added). Senator Webb also
noted:
The steep increase in the number of people in prison is driven,
according to most experts, by changes in drug policy and tougher
sentencing, and not necessarily an increase in crime. Also, the
composition of prison admissions has shifted toward less serious offenses:
parole violations and drug offenses. Nearly 6 in 10 persons in state
prison for a drug offense have no history of violence or significant selling
activity. In 2005, four out of five drug arrests were for possession and
only one out of five were for sales.
Id.
20. See Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes
Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
75, 76 (1999) (noting that money is allocated to states from the federal
government based on the average number of violent crimes committed in the
preceding three years).
21. Crime rates have continued to fall and have failed to significantly
correlate with prison population and reentry numbers, confounding predictions
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determine whether there is a rise in crime, the number of people
22
in prison is not chief among them. In other words, locking up
millions of people and throwing away the key has not reduced
crime as promised.
The proliferation of new penal offenses and stepped-up
23
accompanied by
enforcement of existing penal statutes
mandatory minimum prison terms, escalating recidivist and truthand perplexing criminal justice policymakers. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, ONE IN 31:
THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 20 (2009), available at http://www.
pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-2609.pdf (“[E]ven the statistical models most generous to prisons find that most of
the crime drop was attributable to forces other than incarceration. These include
a strengthening economy, aging drug epidemics and changes in law enforcement,
including the expansion of police forces and the adoption of new policing
strategies.”); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24crime.html
?_r=3&scp=1&sq=%22Steady%20Decline%20in%20Major%20Crime%20Baffles%
20Experts%22&st=cse (“Nationally, the drop in violent crime not only calls into
question the theory that crime rates are closely correlated with economic
hardship, but another argument as well, said Frank E. Zimring, a law professor at
the University of California, Berkeley. As the percentage of people behind bars
has decreased in the past few years, violent crime rates have fallen as well. For
those who believed that higher incarceration rates inevitably led to less crime, ‘this
would also be the last time to expect a crime decline,’ he said.”). See generally
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–
2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2011), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf (“In the last decade (since 2000)
the homicide rate declined to levels last seen in the mid-1960s.”); Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 19 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.
2010/2010%20CIUS%20Summary.pdf (“The 2010 statistics show that the
estimated volumes of violent and property crimes declined 6.0 percent and 2.7
percent, respectively, when compared with the 2009 estimates.”). For access to the
full report, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2010, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crimein-the-u.s.-2010 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). For current and earlier reports, visit
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
22. See Marc Mauer & David Cole, Five Myths About Americans in Prison, WASH.
POST (June 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-mythsabout-incarceration/2011/06/13/AGfIWvYH_story.html (“Harvard University
sociologist Bruce Western believes that increased incarceration accounts for only
about 10 percent of the drop in crime rates; William Spelman, a professor of
public affairs at the University of Texas, puts the figure at about 25 percent. Even
if the higher figure is accurate, three-quarters of the crime decline had nothing to
do with imprisonment. Other causes include changes in drug markets, policing
strategies and community initiatives to reshape behavior.”).
23. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold
of Guilt Declines, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111904060604576570801651620000.html.
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in-sentencing laws, and buttressed by reflexive parole board
24
denials, are the principle mechanisms for incarcerating people
25
The result is “one in 100 adults
and keeping them in prison.
looking out at this country from behind an expensive wall of
26
Removing people from society has not eliminated the
bars.”
causes of crime, and has solved far fewer problems than the cost of
this approach has warranted.
The consequences of carceral inflation have not produced any
27
true countervailing benefits. Any law that can incarcerate people
and send them to prison for a mandatory number of years will cast
28
an excessively wide net capable of emptying entire city blocks. In
24. This should be qualified by the changing policies for release, “where
parole still exists.” See, e.g., Joe Lambe & Tony Rizzo, Concerns Arise Over Plan to
Dissolve Kansas Parole Board, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 3, 2011, at § B, 1 (“About 15 states
have eliminated parole boards.”).
25. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 6 (2010), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/uploadedFiles/Collateral_Costs.pdf?n=8653.
Rather, the growth flowed primarily from changes in sentencing laws,
inmate release decisions, community supervision practices and other
correctional policies that determine who goes to prison and for how
long. And while expanded incarceration contributed to the drop in
violent crime in the United States during the 1990s, research shows that
having more prisoners accounted for only about 25 percent of the
reduction, leaving the other 75 percent to be explained by better
policing and a variety of other, less expensive factors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 21
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One
%20in%20100.pdf.
The United States incarcerates more people than any country in the
world, including the far more populous nation of China. At the start of
the new year, the American penal system held more than 2.3 million
adults. China was second, with 1.5 million people behind bars, and
Russia was a distant third with 890,000 inmates, according to the latest
available figures. Beyond the sheer number of inmates, America also is
the global leader in the rate at which it incarcerates its citizenry,
outpacing nations like South Africa and Iran. In Germany, 93 people are
in prison for every 100,000 adults and children. In the U.S, the rate is
roughly eight times that, or 750 per 100,000.
Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).
27. See Effective Investments in Public Safety: Mass Incarceration and Longer
Sentences Fail to Make Us Safer, JUST. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2, 2007),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/07-02_fac_
massincarceration_ac-ps.pdf.
28. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Million-Dollar Blocks: The Neighborhood Costs of
America’s Prison Boom, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 9, 2004), http://www.villagevoice.com
/2004-11-09/news/million-dollar-blocks/1/.
In Brooklyn last year, there were 35 blocks that fit this category [(Million-
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addition, prison walls cast a long shadow that follow inmates back
into society, where they are hard put to find housing, jobs, or
29
reunite with their families after years of desocialization.
30
In a recent article, Professor Bruce Western made three key
observations about the corrosive effect of mass incarceration on
society: (1) persons with prison records do not fare as well
31
economically as those who have never served time; (2) the
families of the incarcerated suffer as well, resulting in harm to the
32
core family units without a father or mother to stabilize them; and
(3) the prison preference in punishment negatively impacts the
perception of justice in the neighborhoods most directly affected
33
by this shift in population from homes to prison cells. Overall,
Professor Western believes that the negative effects of mass
34
Sentencing
imprisonment have reached the tipping point.
increasingly large numbers of people to jail has an inverse effect on
the ability to reduce or control crime. At the same time, those who
return to society find fewer opportunities because of their prison
records, and therefore become more susceptible to recidivism.
Home life for many is disrupted when a parent is sent to prison,
putting their children at risk of problems in school or delinquent

Dollar Blocks)]—ones where so many residents were sent to state prison
that the total cost of their incarceration will be more than $1 million.
....
A map of million-dollar blocks, with stark concentrations of color, can
quickly convey a sense of how self-defeating many criminal-justice policies
have become—how, for example, spending exorbitant amounts of money
locking people up means there’s far less money available for programs
that decrease crime, like education, drug treatment, mental-health care,
and job training.
Id. at 1, 2.
29. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral
Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1213 (2010) (discussing the
obstacles in employment, housing and civil life facing the massive numbers of
prisoners released back into society); Edgardo Rotman, Criminal Law: Do Criminal
Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1023, 1023 (1986) (describing the need to recognize that a rehabilitative mindset
ought to inform the process for prisoner reentry, which is at least impliedly found
in constitutional principles applied to the treatment of prisoners).
30. See Bruce Western, Locked Up, Locked Out: The Social Costs of Incarceration,
REASON (July 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/06/locked-up-lockedout.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
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35

behavior.
There are a host of other issues created by government
management of such a large segment of the population that are
unrelated to incarceration as punishment. Among the collateral
but motivating issues fueling policy debates on the efficacy and
necessity of prisons are economics, (i.e., the importance of
36
correctional facilities to local and state economies); census
37
38
and voting rights;
prison labor and the issues
counts
39
surrounding its use, wages, and working conditions; and the
awarding of contracts to private companies to run correctional
40
facilities. These non-penological issues have nothing to do with
41
crime rates, rehabilitation, or the welfare of the incarcerated.
35.
36.

Id.
See Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org
/scans/huling_chapter.pdf (“Communities suffering from declines in farming,
mining, timber-work and manufacturing are now begging for prisons to be built in
their backyards.”).
POL’Y
INITATIVE,
37. See,
e.g.,
New
York,
PRISON
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/newyork.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012)
(“New York State enacted legislation ensuring that incarcerated persons will be
counted as residents of their home communities when state and local legislative
districts are redrawn in New York next year.”).
38. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Voting Behind Bars: An Argument for Voting by Prisoners,
54 HOW. L.J. 549, 550 (2011) (“[F]elony disenfranchisement policies are
inherently undemocratic no matter how applied.”).
39. See generally Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What
Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 395 (2009) (discussing how the Eighth Amendment and the Thirteenth
Amendment should apply to prison labor); Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries
of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61
VAND. L. REV. 857 (2008) (taking a look at employment’s economic character as
seen through the window of legal disputes over prison labor).
40. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL
STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION
POLICIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy
/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf (“Approximately 129,000 people were held
in privately managed correctional facilities in the United States as of December 31,
2009; 16.4 percent of federal and 6.8 percent of state populations were held in
private facilities.” (footnote omitted)).
See generally Ruth Levush, Israel:
Unconstitutionality of Privatization of Prisons, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401697_text
(“The
[Supreme] Court [of Israel, sitting as a High Court of Justice,] determined that
the transfer of management and operation of a prison from the state to a private
corporation by awarding it a franchise would cause harm to the constitutional
rights of freedom of liberty and human dignity of the prisoners.”).
41. In these precarious economic times, prison is seen by some as a substitute
for social services. For example, a man voluntarily sought incarceration by
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They are all the indisputable concomitants of a form of
punishment that is also an industry where “time is money.”
A depiction of the prison-industrial complex phenomena
made in 1998 is telling, as the policies that led to this state of affairs
have not changed:
[The prison-industrial complex] is composed of
politicians, both liberal and conservative, who have used
the fear of crime to gain votes; impoverished rural areas
where prisons have become a cornerstone of economic
development; private companies that regard the roughly
$35 billion spent each year on corrections not as a burden
on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and
government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along
42
with the inmate population.
The fallout from these policies and practices will be examined
in light of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Brown v.
43
Plata and California’s innovative legislative response.

robbing a bank in order to gain access to health care. See Diane Turbyfill, Bank
Robber Planned Crime and Punishment, GASTON GAZETTE (June 16, 2011, 5:18 PM),
http://www.gastongazette.com/news/bank-58397-richard-hailed.html (describing
James Richard Verone, a 59-year-old unemployed man suffering from
excruciatingly painful, undiagnosed medical problems and lacking any financial
resources, who turned to bank robbery as a means for getting health care). While
incarceration might seem like a viable, albeit desperate solution, there is no
guarantee that access to health care will be provided. See, e.g., Ohio Inmate Kills Self;
Lawyers Claim Mistreatment, HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W. Va.) (June 2, 2011,
9:00 PM), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/x295394202/Ohio-inmate-killsself-lawyers-claim-mistreatment (“Gregory Stamper, convicted of a double
homicide in 1995, hanged himself on Wednesday at Allen Correctional Institution
in Lima in northwestern Ohio. Stamper, 61, suffered from damage to his nervous
system but was taken off a medication that had helped ease the pain, the Ohio
Justice and Policy Center said Thursday.”).
42. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1998, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/theprison-industrial-complex/4669/ (“Since 1991 the rate of violent crime in the
United States has fallen by about 20 percent, while the number of people in prison
or jail has risen by 50 percent. The prison boom has its own inexorable logic.
Steven R. Donziger, a young attorney who headed the National Criminal Justice
Commission in 1996, explains the thinking: ‘If crime is going up, then we need to
build more prisons; and if crime is going down, it’s because we built more
prisons—and building even more prisons will therefore drive crime down even
lower.’”); see also Public Safety Performance Project: State Corrections Spending, PEW
CENTER ON STATES (2005), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles
/Statistics%20and%20Facts.pdf (“Federal, state and local governments spend
approximately $62 billion per year on adult and juvenile corrections.”).
43. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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III. BROWN V. PLATA: PRISON CONDITIONS REVEALED
The constitutionality of prison conditions was the central issue
44
in a pair of cases that exposed the fault lines in the California
criminal justice system and ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court.
45
The Court’s five-four decision in Brown v. Plata, upholding the
three-judge federal panel’s order to reduce the state’s prison
population to 137.5% of design capacity, revealed the shortcomings
of mass incarceration for the entire justice system.
In 2011, the State of California became the poster child for the
46
most pernicious outcome of mass incarceration—overcrowding.
The deplorable state of its prisons due to the lack of adequate
medical and mental health care had been the subject of studies and
47
inquiries over the years, but did not garner serious attention until
44. Two prisoner class actions were filed against California officials claiming
indifference to medical and psychological health needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8878 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005) (discussing medical neglect in the prison system);
Coleman v. Wilson, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786
(E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994) (discussing inmates with serious mental health care
needs). These cases were eventually consolidated before a special three-judge
court convened by the Ninth Circuit, which ordered the population reduction.
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, No. C01-1351 TEH,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2711, at *30 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (noting its
August 4, 2009 finding that overcrowding was the primary cause of the failure of
the State to provide constitutionally sufficient medical and mental health care and
that a prison release order was the only effective remedy under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4)), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Plata, 131
S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
45. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910.
46. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Ruling on Prison Overcrowding a Warning to States?,
MCCLATCHY (May 24, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/24/114702
/ruling-on-prison-overcrowding.html (“All 50 states got a wakeup call this week
when the Supreme Court ordered California to aggressively reduce its prison
overcrowding. The [C]ourt’s decision will make it easier for judges to shrink
prison populations elsewhere. It also could embolden other challenges to prison
conditions well beyond California.”).
47. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS:
TIME IS RUNNING OUT (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185
/Report185.pdf; CORRS. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, CALIFORNIA PERFORMANCE REVIEW,
REFORMING CORRECTIONS 121–61 (2004), available at http://cpr.ca.gov/Review
_Panel/pdf/from7to11.pdf (discussing inmate and parolee population
management); LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO
LOWER PRISON COSTS AND REDUCE CRIME (1998), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov
/studies/144/report144.pdf; see also Proclamation, Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor of Cal., Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 4,
2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 (listing the overcrowding
numbers at California state prisons and correctional institutions and proclaiming a
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two longstanding lawsuits finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
The first class action, Coleman v. Brown, had been filed in 1990 on
behalf of prisoners with “serious mental disorders” who were not
receiving adequate care or supervision and endured unbearable
49
The other
conditions resulting in a substantial suicide rate.
action launched in 2001, Plata v. Brown, represented the
complaints of inmates with “serious medical conditions” that were
50
not getting necessary treatment.
After dealing with court orders for five years in Plata and
twelve years in Coleman, it was clear that the proposed remedies had
51
failed. The tribulations cataloged by the courts below persisted
and finally led to the convening of a special three-judge court to
52
resolve them. Among the problems created by overcrowding, the
three-judge court took note of the overtaxed staff and medical
facilities and the dangerous and unsanitary environment due to the
lack of treatment, all of which hindered the implementation of a
53
constitutional remedy. But the appropriateness of the remedy in
response to the harm uncovered had to be measured by the acid
54
test of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). Thus,
the issue boiled down to whether the three-judge court had
correctly followed procedures under the PLRA and given the state
sufficient time to pursue other options when it concluded that a
prisoner release order was the only answer to the conditions
55
uncovered in California’s prisons.
State of Emergency).
48. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910.
49. Id. at 1922, 1926.
50. Id. at 1926–27.
51. Id. at 1923, 1931.
52. Id. at 1922. The conditions precedent to the three-judge court were met
by the Coleman court’s appointment of a Special Master, the Plata consent decree
and receivership, and the State’s failure to address the constitutional claims in
both cases. Id. at 1930–32.
53. Id. at 1932.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
55. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922–23.
Under the PLRA, only a three-judge court may enter an order limiting a
prison population. Before a three-judge court may be convened, a
district court first must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that
failed to remedy the constitutional violation and must have given the
defendant a reasonable time to comply with its prior orders.
Id. at 1929 (internal citations omitted). The viewpoints expressed in the majority
and dissenting opinions are the first referendum by the Supreme Court on the
efficacy and legality of systemic remedies to prison conditions envisioned by
Congress under the PLRA.
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A. The Majority
Prison is the antipode of all the liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
Those liberties are curtailed as part of the
punishment narrative. Nonetheless, each person behind bars is a
node of needs, rights, and responsibilities, like any citizen in
society. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Brown v. Plata,
recognized that the essentials of food, shelter, and clothing had to
56
In other
be provided and regulated by prison administration.
words, a person extracted from their place in the world and
deposited within the confines of a penal institution radiates needs
that are not fairly taken into account in assessing sentencing laws,
the size of prison populations, and the resources devoted to that
population’s care and supervision. This is the overarching reason
behind the deleterious conditions of confinement revealed in
litigation over violations of the Eighth Amendment, and has
resulted principally from prison overcrowding. Yet, was it the
essential cause or just one of many?
The majority’s analysis of the problem in Plata began with the
PLRA’s requirement that “crowding” had to have been the
57
“primary cause” of the constitutional violation. Since this finding
relied on a factual determination, the Court was sensitive to the
58
need for deference to the trial court’s findings. Justice Kennedy
recounted the long, sad history of mental and medical health care
in the California prison system revealed by the record in the courts
59
below.
Vacancies for key health care positions had been unfilled at
the time of trial: “[Twenty percent] for surgeons, 25% for
physicians, 39% for nurse practitioners, and 54.1% for
60
psychiatrists.” And filling these positions did not address the lack
56. Id. at 1928 (“To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to
provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food,
clothing, and necessary medical care. . . . A prison that deprives prisoners of basic
sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of
human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E). “The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner
release order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that—(i)
crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and (ii) no other
relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.” Id.
58. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932. Ironically, this deference is a critical fault raised
by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, to be discussed later. See infra notes
110–25 and accompanying text.
59. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932–34.
60. Id. at 1932.
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61

of space for performing necessary services. The combination of
insufficient staffing and space resulted in “significant delays in
62
Inmates seeking mental health care were typically
treatment.”
held in segregation until a bed was available, while others were
63
And the line for
confined in “tiny, phone-booth sized cages.”
64
medical care was as long as 700 people at any given time. The
other concomitants of overcrowding that aggravated the lack of
treatment for mental and physical problems included “unsafe and
65
unsanitary living conditions” and an uptick in violence among
66
prisoners.
The State complained that the three-judge court did not
67
permit introduction of evidence showing current conditions.
Justice Kennedy found that this assertion was betrayed by the lower
court’s reliance on current data and information sources: recent
facility tours by expert witnesses; expert evaluations; statistics on
suicide rates, staff vacancies, shortages of treatment beds, as well as
68
other data. Overall, information about past problems and current
conditions formed a continuum of evidence that was suitable to
make a finding under the PLRA. Thus, the State’s claim lacked
merit.
While prison crowding was not the only cause of these
conditions, it was the foremost.
And the lower courts
acknowledged that population reduction alone would not be
adequate unless accompanied by other reforms (i.e., staff training,
improvement in facilities, and revamping existing procedures for
69
health care management). Still, the Court emphasized that the
congressional intent behind the PLRA was that overcrowding had
61. Id. at 1933.
62. Id.
63. Id. See id. at app. C for a picture and caption that reads: “Salinas Valley
State Prison, July 29, 2008, Correctional Treatment Center (dry cages/holding
cells for people waiting for mental health crisis bed).”
64. Id.
65. Id. At any given time, 200 prisoners live in a gymnasium monitored by
only two or three correctional officers and “[a]s many as 54 prisoners may share a
single toilet.” Id. at 1924 (referring to images in appendix B at page 1949 with
captions from the original opinion: “Mule Creek State Prison, Aug. 1, 2008” and
“California Institution for Men, Aug. 7, 2006,”).
66. Id. at 1934. Inmate violence resulted in lockdowns that increased the
workload for staff escorting prisoners to the medical facilities, or resulted in the
cancellation of certain programs altogether during these periods. Id.
67. Id. at 1935.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1936.
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to be the “primary cause,” albeit not the only reason for
70
unconstitutional prison conditions.
Justice Kennedy went on to observe that addressing these
severe deficiencies in the conditions of confinement would be
impeded by state budget deficits, absence of political motivation for
reform, poorly designed facilities, and across the board
71
Thus, a complex problem
administrative mismanagement.
necessitated a complex solution. Again, relying on Congress’s
intent in authorizing federal courts to handle these types of
problems, the Court held that the PLRA was not written to fetter
the federal district courts in ordering “practical remedies” in the
72
face of system-wide failure. Population release orders were to be
strictly construed, but were still available to be employed in the
73
right circumstances. Releasing prisoners was an option of “last
74
resort,” but still one that could be resorted to. The fact that other
steps would also be necessary to fix the problem did not diminish
75
the primacy of the release order. In other words, a finding that
prison overcrowding was the primary cause of constitutional
violations did not preclude a multifaceted solution.
Another prong of the PLRA statute mandated that “no other
76
relief” would resolve the issue. As already discussed, a principal
cause did not mandate a single solution. But the other remedies
proffered by the state (i.e., prisoner transfer, new construction, and
77
additional hires), did not measure up. The record demonstrated
that transferring prisoners was inadequate to reduce their
numbers; new prisons were unlikely to be built in light of
California’s fiscal difficulties; plans to expand existing buildings
failed to include sufficient administrative facilities; new hires were
unlikely in view of the inability to fill those positions so far; and
even if those positions were filled promptly, there was no place for
78
them to work. California’s budgetary and legislative roadblocks
and the state’s record of not making inroads on its proposed
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1937.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104–21, at 25(1995)).
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2006) (stating that “no other relief will
remedy the violation of the Federal right.”).
77. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1937.
78. Id. at 1937–38.
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solutions demonstrated to the Court that the past was prologue.
The state’s lack of progress became a major factor in approving the
79
three-judge court’s decision to order prisoner release.
While population reduction was the most efficacious method
for alleviating the pressures created by unconstitutional conditions
of confinement, it did not obscure the effect of the sudden reentry
80
of thousands of inmates into California communities. The PLRA
was clear about the need to make solutions “narrowly drawn” so
that there was a fit between problem and solution obviating the
81
risks of fallout on society at large. The statute demanded that the
remedy be proportional to the problem.
A solution contending with overcrowding was bound to have
collateral effects. Nonetheless, the remedy of prisoner release was
82
not invalidated for that reason. Thus, the scope of the order had
83
to reflect the unconstitutional conditions in the complaints. The
Court found that limiting the remedy only to the plaintiffs in these
class actions would have been too narrow and would not address
the revolving numbers of persons who would inevitably require
84
medical and mental health treatment. The plaintiffs were victims
of systemic problems, and a remedy tailored only to them and
failing to fix systemic conditions would only result in chronic
litigation by newly minted victims. In addition, a systemic remedy
did not translate into an overbroad solution, since administration
and resources for the prisons’ medical facilities are operated at the
79. Id. at 1939 (“A long history of failed remedial orders, together with
substantial evidence of overcrowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care,
compels a different conclusion today.”).
80. See generally Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVE,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2012).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
(a) Requirements for relief. (1) Prospective relief. (A) Prospective relief
in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to
any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939–40.
83. Id. at 1940.
84. Id.
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85

state level.
Moreover, granulating the release order would have impinged
on the state officials’ power to structure an appropriate population
reduction plan. Indeed, the three-judge court’s order gave
California “substantial flexibility” in deciding who should be
86
released, and to customize the release plan based on each
87
prison. Still, some judicial supervision was required to assure that
88
the order was carried out. Deference to the authority and power
of state officials in administering the prison system was appropriate
according to the Court, but the PLRA did not contemplate
complete abdication of judicial oversight—the heart of the
problem had been the failure of the state to implement its
89
proposed solutions.
The release of tens of thousands of prisoners by judicial fiat
demanded serious attention to public safety and the operations of
the criminal justice system. While the PLRA did not require that
90
the prisoner release order have no adverse effects, a balance had
91
to be struck. There was already a steady stream of thousands of
92
inmates reentering California communities, but the population
cap would result in a sudden influx of 46,000 prisoners (or fewer if
the 9,000 prisoner population reduction that had already occurred
93
was counted). Still, the issue was whether the harm created by
unabated overcrowding outweighed the effects on the community
94
of releasing inmates to ease the pressure within prisons. Relying
on statistical evidence, and the testimony of state officials and
expert witnesses, the three-judge court—employing a cost-benefit
95
analysis—had found in favor of prisoner release.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1940–41.
Id. at 1941.
Id.
Id. at 1941–42
Id. at 1942.
See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009 app. tbl.10 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj
.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (including California releases by year: 2000:
129,621; 2008: 136,925; 2009: 128,869).
93. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923, 1946. It was revealed at oral argument that in the
two years since the three-judge court’s decision, California had reduced the prison
population by 9,000 inmates. Id. at 1946.
94. Id. at 1941.
95. Id. at 1942–43 (including expert evidence in the form of studies of the
uneventful release of prisoners in other states to ease overcrowding).
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The state had several options that would have had negligible
effects on public safety—for example, granting more good time
credits and early release to low-risk recidivists; diversion of low-risk
offenders to community-based treatment programs or home
monitoring; and handling technical parole violations through
96
community-based programs. These channels for supervising and
monitoring offenders in the community already existed—and
debunked the argument that a decrease in the inmate populations
would simply involve opening the prison doors. And other reentry
programs were in place to ease the transition of the huge number
of inmates who were already returning to the community under
97
Also, during the pendency of the
normal circumstances.
litigation, officials had begun to implement measure that would
redirect state-sentenced prisoners to local jails—with no impact on
98
public safety.
The population cap, 137.5% of design capacity, was arrived at
by the three-judge court by extrapolation from official and expert
99
testimony about the appropriate limits. The state contended that
the court relied too heavily on experts who were offering policy
100
But Justice Kennedy
positions rather than realistic estimates.
noted that expert evidence was essential in considering this type of
issue and in fashioning a remedy for violations based on prison
101
For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had set
conditions.
130% as its ultimate aim for population limits, which had been
102
And the use of such standards proved
adopted by the experts.
instructive albeit nonbinding. At the same time, California’s
Corrections Independent Review Panel put forward 145% as a
103
workable number. Still, this figure did not take into account the
unconstitutional conditions created by inadequate mental and
104
medical health care. In light of the problems to be resolved and
the absence of more suitable figures from the state, an equitable
compromise seemed appropriate, which is how the lower three96. Id. at 1943.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1943–44.
99. Id. at 1944.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1944–45 (“[E]xpert opinion may be relevant when determining
what is obtainable and what is acceptable in corrections philosophy.”).
102. Id. at 1945.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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105

judge court reached the 137.5% figure.
The two-year deadline ordered by the lower court was set to
106
As noted
run from the date of the Supreme Court’s decision.
earlier, the state had already made some gains since the 2009 lower
107
Yet, the court issuing a remedy for a continuing
court ruling.
violation retains responsibility for seeing that it is accomplished in
108
Also, since state prison officials
a timely and effective manner.
retained the discretion in their choice of methods for attaining the
goal of population reduction, the deadline could be modified upon
109
the state’s motion based on their efforts at compliance.
Thus, the majority opinion upheld the lower court’s decision,
rejecting arguments by the state that the remedy was too broad,
insufficiently supported, and overstepped the judiciary’s proper
role by intruding upon the management of the state prison system.
However, four justices in two dissenting opinions took up these
arguments in their criticism of what they collectively considered to
be judicial overreaching.
B. The Dissents
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, voiced strong
disapproval of the majority’s ruling that would allow the release of
110
thousands of convicted felons back onto the streets. This remedy
was so disturbing and “absurd” that Justice Scalia believed the law
ought to be interpreted in any manner necessary to avoid the
111
result. He pointed out that a strict reading of the PLRA as well as
105. Id. (“The PLRA’s narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied so long as these
equitable, remedial judgments are made with the objective of releasing the fewest
possible prisoners consistent with an efficacious remedy.”).
106. Id. at 1946.
107. See id. (“At oral argument, the State indicated it had reduced its prison
population by approximately 9,000 persons since the decision of the three-judge
court. After oral argument, the State filed a supplemental brief indicating that it
had begun to implement measures to shift ‘thousands’ of additional prisoners to
county facilities.”).
108. Id. at 1946–47.
109. Id. at 1947; see Defendants’ December 2011 Status Report in Response to
June 30, 2011 Order, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 LKK JFM P, No. 01-cv01351-TEH (E.D. & N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov
/News/docs/December-3JC-Status-Report.pdf (status report to three-judge court).
110. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court affirms
what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s
history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000
convicted criminals.”).
111. Id. at 1950–51.
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a judge’s limited role under Article III of the Constitution should
112
The
have prevented this overbroad and “dangerous” injunction.
PLRA authorized relief so long as it was specific to individual harm,
and not as a means for influencing systemic reforms and
113
In fact, to Justice Scalia,
micromanaging penal institutions.
claims of inadequate medical or mental health care violating the
Eighth Amendment should have required a showing by every single
114
Justice Scalia contended
member of the plaintiffs in each class.
that because an inmate’s status as prisoner seemingly met the
threshold requirement for relief under the Eighth Amendment
due to a claimed systemic deficiency, it relieved plaintiffs of making
115
And a system-wide remedy that would
individual showings.
release an indiscriminate number of prisoners would be overbroad
116
and benefit more inmates than warranted.
The majority endorsed the use of a “structural injunction,”
which recast judges as administrators of societal institutions
117
And it rendered judges into
according to Justice Scalia.
118
Justice Scalia was very
policymakers as the state had feared.
concerned with judges taking on roles outside their province,
which was illustrated by the majority’s selective reliance on fact119
Ironically, to
finding that was actually policymaking in disguise.
Justice Scalia, this was an instance of misplaced deference to the
120
trial court’s findings.
In Justice Scalia’s view, this egregious validation of
incompetent policymaking by judges was compounded by the
extraordinary remedy of indiscriminately releasing thousands of
121
In addition to the public safety risks, the remedy
inmates.
trumped lawfully imposed sentences. The state’s interest in the

112. Id. at 1951, 1966.
113. Id. at 1951.
114. Id. at 1952.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1953 (“Most of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions
or severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens
who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1953–54.
119. Id. at 1954 (“I am not saying that the District Judges rendered their
factual findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is impossible for judges to make
‘factual findings’ without inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual
findings are policy judgments.”).
120. Id. at 1955.
121. Id. at 1956.
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closure and finality of criminal litigation would be undermined by
122
In his view, the
this open-ended approach to prisoners’ rights.
PLRA was not intended as an instrument for imposing structural
123
Justice Scalia
injunctions, but rather a way of limiting them.
would have been in favor of specific findings of harm for specific
prisoners and specific remedies in fulfillment of the statute’s
124
Systemic constitutional claims
“narrowly drawn” requirement.
125
Therefore, in his
were at best rare exceptions under the PLRA.
opinion, mass release of 46,000 prisoners was threading a needle
with a sledgehammer without consideration of its impact on society
at large.
On the issue of systemic problems, Justice Alito, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, also dissented because not all “undesirable”
126
Inhumane
prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment.
but constitutional conditions were not within the province of the
PLRA. Justice Alito argued that the three-judge court did not make
a finding that the “current” prison population levels were
127
responsible for the deficits in medical and mental health care.
Like Justice Scalia, he would have preferred a remedy that tackled
the specific problems of those plaintiffs actually harmed by
inadequate health care facilities. In his view, the lower court’s
order was not well-aimed to help those inmates, and painting with
such a broad brush increased the risk of harm to society through
128
the discharge of too many prisoners.
Justice Alito’s principal criticisms centered on the three-judge
court’s refusal to take into account evidence about “current”
conditions, unwillingness to consider remedies short of mass
129
release, and shortsighted treatment of the risks to public safety.
The PLRA was intended to address continuing violations that
130
According
existed at the time when a remedy could be ordered.
to Justice Alito, the trial court relied on outdated information and
131
The court’s
foreclosed the state from introducing new evidence.
122. Id. (pointing to similar concerns raised in cases where the Court reversed
grants of habeas corpus by the Ninth Circuit).
123. Id. at 1958.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1959–60.
130. Id. at 1960.
131. Id.
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choice of remedy was inextricably bound with the present state of
132
And relief for constitutional
the problem to be answered.
violations was to be evaluated in terms of “present and future, not
133
Finally, the remedy of releasing prisoners did
past, conditions.”
134
not directly address the need to improve medical care.
As for the State’s proposed remedies, Justice Alito believed
that they were not given a fair hearing by the three-judge court.
That court was not evaluating those options in the light of
conditions at the time the order was issued and thus a less drastic
135
Also, Justice Alito felt that
alternative might have been viable.
the lower court was more concerned with conditions that violated
public policy than with determining whether they met minimal
136
In addition, the court did not
constitutional requirements.
137
consider remedies that were time delayed. Yet, the PLRA did not
mandate choosing the swifter option, especially when such an
138
In Justice
option was outweighed by the impact on public safety.
Alito’s opinion, the state could have filled the vacant positions,
improved their procedures, and purchased the needed supplies
139
and equipment without releasing anyone. This smaller “targeted
program,” aimed at repair and expansion of current state facilities,
140
Even out-of-state
seemed more achievable and less risky.
transfers might have been a viable alternative forestalling the
court’s resort to the final option of releasing a limited number of
141
inmates from the two plaintiff classes.
Citing the dangers of mass prisoner releases as “inherently
risky,” Justice Alito chided the majority for its overreliance on
deference when it came to assessing the public safety implications

132. Id. at 1961.
133. Id. at 1962. This reasoning ignores the nature of information gathering.
Site inspections, commission studies, statistical surveys, and official reporting are
all time-consuming methods. While Justice Alito acknowledged that evidence of
past violations was relevant, he offered no guidance about where to find the type
of up-to-date information he would have required. See id. Unfortunately, there is
no information system that can provide real-time prison data to the same extent as
a traffic report or stock market ticker.
134. Id. at 1963.
135. Id. at 1963–64.
136. Id. at 1964.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1965.
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142

of the remedy.
Deference was not always ideal when it came to
evaluating penology based on expert opinions, which were policy
143
On this point,
oriented, as compared to evaluation of raw facts.
Justice Alito noted that the increase in the California prison
population had been accompanied by a drop in the violent crime
rate—suggesting that crime rates may have decreased due to longer
144
Thus the opposite might also be true, and
prison sentences.
releasing more prisoners back into society could lead to a rise in
145
Forecasting a doomsday scenario, Justice Alito
the crime rate.
concluded that the overriding reliance on criminal justice policy as
opposed to the PLRA’s intuitive policy that mass release orders
146
were inherently unsafe would result in a “grim roster of victims.”
C. The Appropriateness of the Majority’s Holding
For the Supreme Court to issue a decision endorsing the
seemingly drastic remedy of prison population reduction might
appear to be judicial overreaching. But the majority’s opinion was
147
consistent with the letter and intent of the PLRA. The majority’s
reasoning showed deference to statutory language and lower court
findings, and it found that the release order remedy was
148
appropriate and necessary under the PLRA’s criteria for relief.
The dissenting Justices tagged the majority decision as judicial
activism because they felt that it improperly deferred to the three142. Id. at 1965–67. Justice Alito referred to the prison cap ordered by a
federal court for Philadelphia’s prisons and the disastrous result of freeing
thousands of inmates, after which nearly 10,000 new crimes occurred, including
violent felonies. Id. at 1965–66. Congress had been conscious of this occurrence
in the early 1990s before the PLRA was enacted. Id.
143. Id. at 1966–67.
144. Id.; see supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text for an opposing view.
145. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1967.
146. Id.
147. The Court’s recent decisions interpreting the PLRA have been faithful to
the statute’s language and intent to curtail unmeritorious prisoner lawsuits. See
generally Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Prison
Litigation Reform Act—Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. FED.2D 143 (2010) (noting that
Supreme Court cases interpreting the PLRA have been consistent with the
legislative goals of limiting the number of prisoner filings and raising the quality
of suits brought and that the Court has ruled against inmates in most of these
types of cases).
148. See Eighth Amendment: Prison Population Reduction Order—Leading Cases, 125
HARV. L. REV. 261, 262 (2011) (suggesting that the holding in Brown v. Plata was
not the result of judicial activism but adherence to the PLRA, state prison
administrator realities and needs, and the record of conditions found by the threejudge court).
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judge court’s findings, which the dissenters deemed policymaking
in disguise, and argued that the majority ignored the dangerous
149
At the same time, it
consequences for the public welfare.
appeared that the dissenters selectively disregarded the findings of
the trial court and employed their own outcome-based assessment
by repeatedly referring to gloomy predictions that were without
150
foundation.
For all of these criticisms, the majority stayed true to the
scheme established in the PLRA, which contemplated the use of
population limits and reduction as a remedy in the right
circumstances. The majority followed the text of the statute, relied
on the flexibility of the state in its approach to implementing the
remedy, and relied on the record below without engaging in de
151
Approving the choice of a remedy that
novo review of the facts.
would order the release of a fixed percentage of prisoners rather
than parsing out particular cases was the least intrusive and gave
152
maximum discretion to prison officials in their choice of actions.
The unrestrained overuse of imprisonment inevitably results in
overcrowding, and overcrowding will always produce the catalog of
mistreatment, deprivation, suffering, and death revealed in Brown
153
The three-judge panels convened under the PLRA are
v. Plata.
one step toward ending the cruel conditions of confinement, and a
long one judging by the number of years that the Plata and Coleman
154
Nonetheless, no single decision
plaintiffs pursued their causes.
149. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1959–68
(Alito, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s vague warning to the
District Court that it should modify the injunction], if successful, would achieve
the benefit of a marginal reduction in the inevitable murders, robberies, and rapes
to be committed by the released inmates.”); id. at 1968 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I
fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim
roster of victims. I hope that I am wrong. In a few years, we will see.”).
151. Eighth Amendment: Prison Population Reduction Order—Leading Cases, supra
note 148, at 267–70.
152. Id. at 270.
153. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 853–54 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (“The fact that our prisons are badly overcrowded and
understaffed may well explain many of the shortcomings of our penal systems. But
our Constitution sets minimal standards governing the administration of
punishment in this country . . . and thus it is no answer to the complaints of the
brutalized inmate that the resources are unavailable to protect him from what, in
reality, is nothing less than torture.” (citation omitted)).
154. The main purposes of the PLRA are to allow state officials to address
inmate claims before they reach the court and to filter out prisoner lawsuits to
assure that only meritorious and unaddressed claims are adjudicated in federal

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4

1338

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

ordering population limits will ever adequately address the systemwide deficiencies of every prison. The solution inevitably and
principally falls on legislatures to change the laws concerning
155
incarceration that affect local jail populations, sentencing, and
early release of state prisoners and individuals held in federal
detention facilities, before court dockets collapse under the weight
156
And as the Supreme
of innumerable writs of habeas corpus.
Court recognized in Plata, the harm to some inmates can affect all
inmates due to conditions so pervasive they can only be viewed as
157
unconstitutional punishment.
IV. BEYOND BROWN V. PLATA: IMPLEMENTING CHANGE THROUGH
REALIGNMENT
Acknowledging the fears and worst predictions of the
dissenters in Brown v. Plata, the state has fashioned a response in
which no one will be released early. Before the Supreme Court’s
decision was issued, California’s Governor Edmund Brown signed
158
Assembly Bill 109 (A.B. 109) into law, which will channel noncourts. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203–04 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 83 (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)). Making prison conditions transparent
would serve these purposes by allowing officials throughout the criminal justice
system to address problems before they reach unconstitutional levels.
155. See, e.g., Renewing the Promise of Pretrial Justice for All, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.,
http://www.pretrial.org/symposium.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (“[T]oday . .
. . 500,000 people each day—two out of three of those in our local jails—are
charged with nonviolent offenses but can’t afford bail. The cost to taxpayers is $9
billon each year.”).
156. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1956 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia described the need to respect the integrity of criminal sentences and
compared the problematic majority ruling to the scenario of habeas corpus
litigation that similarly upsets the state’s interest in the finality of convictions. Id.
(“[H]ere, the Court affirms an order granting the functional equivalent of 46,000
writs of habeas corpus, based on its paean to courts’ ‘substantial flexibility when
making these judgments.’” (citation omitted)).
157. Id. at 1940. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the scope of the remedy
under the PLRA fit the scope of the unconstitutional conditions, and was not
overbroad because it will have the collateral effect of benefitting more prisoners
than in the plaintiff class. Id. (“Even prisoners with no present physical or mental
illness may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are at risk so long as
the State continues to provide inadequate care.”).
158. See A.B. 109, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_bill_20110329
_enrolled.html (effective date Oct. 1, 2011); 2011 Public Safety Realignment Fact
Sheet, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet], http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet
.pdf (summarizing A.B. 109 and the trailer funding bills).
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violent, low-level offenders, parolees, and juveniles from state to
local jails. This law will prevent new low-risk criminals from
159
entering the state system, and as for current state prisoners, none
160
will be released early.
California’s remedial legislation will keep inmates in state
facilities from being released before their terms are up or before
their parole is granted in the normal course of events. The
alignment aims to staunch the flow of non-violent, non-serious, and
161
By shifting
non-sex offenders into these institutions.
responsibility to the counties, this legislative response to the
Court’s unprecedented decision will have an unprecedented ripple
effect throughout the state’s criminal justice system. Whether this
local approach will be cost-effective, tamp down the crime rate,
integrate with reentry efforts, and result in more humane
162
treatment of prisoners remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the state’s
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation website has posted
the equivalent of a stock ticker, publishing “Weekly Population
163
This weekly census is an
Figures” for inmates and parolees.
important first step in making the conditions of confinement
164
transparent.
159. See Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor
Brown Issues Statement on U.S. Supreme Court Ruling (May 23, 2011), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17046.
160. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 1, 3. According to the Fact Sheet, “No
inmates currently in state prison will be transferred to county jails or released early.” Id. at
1; see also Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor
Brown Signs Legislation to Improve Public Safety and Empower Local Law
Enforcement (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16964.
161. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 3.
162. See, e.g., Sharon Driscoll, Studying Prison Realignment in Real Time, STAN.
LAW. (Oct. 28, 2011), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2011/10/studyingprison-realignment-in-real-time/. While no official plan for studying the outcome
of A.B. 109 had been included in the legislation, Professor Joan Petersilia at the
Stanford Criminal Justice Center and students in the Advanced Seminar on
Criminal Law & Public Policy will undertake a county-level study of the new law’s
effects in such areas as courtroom dispositions and county jail demographics. Id.
163. See 2011 Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2012).
164. The first benchmark after the Supreme Court’s decision and the newly
implemented state legislation has been a prison population reduction of 8,218 in
the last quarter of 2011. See Defendant’s December 2011 Status Report in
Response to June 30, 2011 Order at 2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 LKK
JFM P, No. 01-cv-01351-TEH (E.D. & N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/December-3JC-Status-Report.pdf (containing
the status report to the three-judge court); Julie Small, California Prison Population
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An important facet of realignment is the creation of
165
The
Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) in each county.
counties, as the new hubs of a significant portion of felons who
otherwise would have entered the state prison system, will have to
assume new responsibilities in this model of local state sentences,
166
One scholar, noting
alternatives to incarceration, and reentry.
the efficacy of state sentencing commissions across the country,
167
Typically,
regards the CCP as a type of sentencing commission.
sentencing commissions study and evaluate information about the
prison population and recidivism rates impacted by changes in
168
sentencing laws and practices. Before A.B. 109 created the CCPs,
the special master and receiver appointed in the prison litigation
169
cases had filled this role.
Under the CCP, California’s fifty-eight counties will oversee
170
the administration of sentences and how they will be carried out.
The sheriffs in charge of the local jails, some of which have been
facing their own overcrowding issues, will superintend pretrial
detainees, defendants convicted of misdemeanors or felonies, and
171
Thus, the new
parolees who violated the terms of their release.
downstream policy of administering justice will transform local
172
And the crowded
correctional centers into one room jailhouses.
173
conditions of those facilities, like the overwhelmed state prisons,
Drops by 8,000 Since Realignment, 89.3KPCC (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.scpr.org
/news/2011/12/16/30375/california-prison-population-dropped-by-8000-since/.
165. See Fact Sheet, supra note 158, at 2 (stating that the CCP, already authorized
under California Penal Code Section 1230, will come up with recommendations to
the county’s Board of Supervisors on how to implement A.B. 109).
166. See id. at 3–4.
167. See Robert Weisberg, California’s De Facto Sentencing Commissions, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online
/californias-de-facto-sentencing-commissions.
168. See id. at 3; see also Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned
Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179 (2007). See generally NAT’L ASS’N
SENT’G COMMISSIONS, http://thenasc.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (acting as a
nonprofit clearinghouse on information “related to sentencing policies, guidelines
and commissions”).
169. Weisberg, supra note 167, at 4–5 (recounting California’s failed attempt to
create a sentencing commission).
170. Id. at 3–4.
171. Id. at 6.
172. The all-encompassing jailhouse is a truism in a culture where
incarceration is the default setting for punishment. Even the idea of alternatives
to incarceration presupposes that prison is the principal starting point.
173. See Richard Winton & Andrew Blankstein, California’s County Jails Struggle
to House Influx of State Prisoners, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/local/la-me-jails-20111210 (depicting
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apparently have not been expressly factored into this remedial
174
legislation.
In addition to this legislative response, a recent decision shows
how courts might take this post-Plata worldview of the criminal
justice system into account. In Thomas v. Schwarzenegger, the inmate
plaintiff filed a § 1983 civil rights complaint against the state based
on the same issues as the Brown v. Plata class action: inadequate
175
Considering that the class
mental, physical, and dental services.
action litigation had already exposed overcrowding as the cause of
these problems, Thomas bypassed the grievance procedure and
176
A summary judgment motion was filed,
went directly to court.
claiming that Thomas failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
177
The district court took into account the
under the PLRA.
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata and the work of the
178
state’s Little Hoover Commission in bringing these problems to
179
light and assigning overcrowding as their principal cause.
Therefore, the court held that the state was not in a position to
180
claim ignorance of these inhumane conditions, and there were
the space problems encountered by local sheriffs faced with a substantial influx of
new offenders, who otherwise would have gone to state prison, under the Supreme
Court’s ruling and A.B. 109); Do the Crime, Do the Time? Maybe Not, in California: Jail
Cell Shortage is Upsetting the Balance, CAL. STATE SHERIFFS’ ASS’N (June 2006),
http://www.calsheriffs.org/Documents/do_the_crime,_do_the_time.pdf
(describing the dilapidated state of California’s 460 local jail facilities and the
overcrowded conditions, which have resulted in escalating pretrial and early
releases to alleviate the pressures).
174. See ALLEN HOPPER ET AL., ACLU OF CAL., COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY
SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY, SAVING MONEY AND
WISELY ALLOCATING LIMITED JAIL SPACE 2 (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org
/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file459_10684.pdf.
Among the twelve
recommendations for making the best of the opportunity afforded by A.B. 109,
the ACLU included point number nine: “[e]nsure that jail conditions and
alternative sanctions meet constitutional standards and are subjected to legal
review before implementation.” Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1938
(2011) (stating that California officials did not pursue the potential remedy of outof-state transfers because the Coleman court imposed a requirement that the
conditions in the receiving institutions satisfied the Eighth Amendment).
175. Thomas v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:07-CV-02310 ODW, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110067, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011).
176. Id. at *1–4.
177. Id. at *1.
178. See supra note 47; infra note 310.
179. Thomas, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110067, at *4–5.
180. Id. at *5–6 (“The court might infer that with the level of attention
surrounding the Coleman and Plata class action suits, prison officials throughout
the state were keenly aware that prison overcrowding was considered by some to
be a major contributing factor in the prison system’s inability to deliver minimally
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triable issues of fact related to their deliberate indifference to those
181
conditions.
The most immediate impact of Brown v. Plata has been a
change in the direction of the California penal system towards the
182
In a state famous for such punishing and
parsimony principle.
183
prison-inflating measures as the three-strikes law, its legislature
has embraced a sentencing scheme that attempts to limit
punishment to no more than necessary in low-impact cases. The
thrust of A.B. 109 has been to redistribute the penal authority to
the counties and to control prison populations by diverting nonviolent, non-serious, and non-sex offenders out of the prison
pipeline. This step alone serves to cap the state prison punishment
scheme, thus moderating the sentences formerly imposed on lowlevel offenders. Indirectly, the law will have a consciousness-raising
effect, because from this point forward, every California judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney will be working in a justice system
reshaped by a remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions.
Meanwhile, the policymakers in different criminal justice
systems across the country, from the federal courts down to the
local justice systems, might be inspired to look in new directions.
The bud of decarceration philosophy has been espoused in Brown
184
v. Plata and implemented by California’s realignment plan.
adequate medical and mental health treatment to prison inmates. It had also
been identified as a cause of increased inmate on inmate violence and posed safety
concerns to staff as well. It would have been very surprising if defendants were
unmindful of either of these two pieces of litigation, the consent decree where the
state indicated it would reduce prison population, or the lengthy trial before the
three-judge court. In fact, ignorance of these events might even be considered a
deliberate indifference to the conditions of those being held in state custody.”).
181. Id. at *8.
182. The parsimony principle dictates that punishments should be measured
proportionate, and no more than needed, to meet the ends of sentencing (i.e., no
gratuitous suffering). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”); Sharon Dolovich,
Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 400–01 (2004)
(discussing the “parsimony principle, on which in all cases punishment must be no
more severe than necessary to achieve the relevant deterrent effect”).
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (2012); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
30 (2003) (holding that California’s three-strikes law, which sent a repeat offender
convicted of stealing golf clubs to prison for twenty-five years to life, did not violate
the Eighth Amendment); A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact After More Than a
Decade, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3
_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm.
184. In fact, there is another attempt at a ballot initiative in California that
would ameliorate the impact of its three-strikes law in the wake of the realignment.
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Other states might take the initiative to build on or inaugurate
185
efforts along the lines of A.B. 109, and to follow-up on such
measures as resentencing for drug offenders serving excessive
186
Perhaps this viewpoint might inspire
mandatory minimums.
introspection on the part of society and remind everyone that in a
nation of laws there are only a few degrees of separation between
187
civilians and prisoners.
See Press Release, Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Three Strikes Initiative Enters
Circulation (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/pressreleases/2011/db11-063.pdf.
The success of this ballot proposal, as with
realignment, will depend on the state’s ability to muster the financial commitment
to see it through. See, e.g., Josh Richman, Money Is Gone, but Proposition 36’s DrugTreatment Mandate Remains, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2011, available at 2011
WLNR 3472022. See generally Prop 36—The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act,
UCLA INTEGRATED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS, http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36
/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
185. See, e.g., Chris Blank, Changes Suggested for Missouri’s Probation and Parole
System, KANSAS CITY STAR (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:48 AM), http://www.kansascity.com
/2011/12/17/3327823/changes-suggested-for-missouris.html (discussing the
Missouri Working Group on Sentencing and Corrections’ recommended changes
to the state’s parole system, such as providing incentives for compliance, shorter
or flash punishments for non-violent and technical violators, and the creation of a
statewide oversight committee); Jessie Halladay, 996 Kentucky Inmates Get Out Early
in New Prison Plan, COURIER-JOURNAL (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:47 PM), http://www.
courier-journal.com/article/20111215/NEWS01/312150063/mandatory-re-entryprisoners-kentucky?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|Local%20News (discussing a new
legislative program to grant early release and reentry support to prisoners within
six-months of their maximum sentence dates; in other words, the legislative
program provides a special reentry parole for inmates who otherwise would have
been released with no support or supervision at the end of their terms).
186. See, e.g., Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, Governor of N.Y., Governor
Cuomo Announces Closure of Seven State Prison Facilities (June 30, 2011),
available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/press
/06302011ClosureOfSevenStatePrisonFacilities (announcing New York prison
population decreases due to reforms to the Rockefeller mandatory minimum
sentencing laws and due to a drop in the state’s crime rate); Drug Law Changes,
N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/drug-lawreform/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); William Gibney, Drug Law
Resentencing: Saving Tax Dollars with Minimal Community Risk, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Jan.
13,
2010),
http://www.legal-aid.org/media/127984/drug-law-reform-paper2009.pdf.
187. This is especially true since millions of people detained pretrial are
presumed innocent, and those serving time behind bars or on parole or probation
have connections to family, communities, and the larger society in which we all
live. Some scholars have proposed that the distance between public perceptions
of offenders and life in prison might be bridged by increasing the involvement of
the public with prisoners. See, e.g., David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass
Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 49 (2011) (suggesting that among the ways
to increase empathy for prisoners and humanize offenders might be to connect
them with people on the outside through joint activities such as educational or
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Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Brown v. Plata
began his analysis with an acknowledgement of a prisoner’s
188
This language adds an important
personhood and dignity.
statement to the armamentarium of rights that can survive behind
189
prison walls. And therefore, the ideas of personhood and dignity
might act reflexively upon sentencing guidelines and trial court
decisions that accept that the conditions of confinement should be
190
a factor in sentencing.

similar programs). Scholars have also put forward the idea that bridging this gap
may reduce recidivism. See MINN. DEP’T OF CORRS., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON
VISITATION ON OFFENDER RECIDIVISM 57 (2011), http://www.doc.state.mn.us
/publications/documents/11-11MNPrisonVisitationStudy.pdf.
Moreover, the
demographics of arrestees and prisoners continue to change, impacting different
segments of society. See, e.g., Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest
from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25–26 (2012); Erica
Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/us/nearly-a-third-of-americans-are-arrested
-by-23-study-says.html (“By age 23, almost a third of Americans have been arrested
for a crime, according to a new study that researchers say is a measure of growing
exposure to the criminal justice system in everyday life.”).
188. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence
of human dignity inherent in all persons.”).
189. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 882–84 (Mont. 2003). In Walker, the
Supreme Court of Montana relied on the “human dignity” provision in the state’s
constitution to address the harm to prisoners caused by behavior management
plans (BMPs). See id. The court held that the BMPs and intolerable living
conditions aggravated the prisoners’ mental health issues and violated their
“inviolable” right of human dignity under article II, section 4 of the state
constitution as well as section 22 (comparable to the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment). See id. at 886.
190. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
169, 222–26 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of “dignity” as
anchors for substantive interests in different contexts; and in particular “collective
virtue as dignity” that underscores the need for humane treatment of prisoners
under the Eighth Amendment, specifically taking into account Justice Kennedy’s
observation in Brown v. Plata); see also HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center for Law and
Business v. Minister of Finance 34 [2009] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files
_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf.
The Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law (no. 28), 5764-2004 (hereafter:
‘amendment 28’), provides that the State of Israel will establish for the
first time a (single) prison that will be operated and managed by a private
corporation rather than by the state. The arrangement provided in
amendment 28 leads to a transfer of basic powers of the state in the field
of law enforcement—imprisonment powers—the exercise of which
involves a continuous violation of human rights, to a private profitmaking corporation. As we shall explain below, this transfer of powers
violates the constitutional rights to personal liberty and human dignity,
which are enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
Id. (emphasis added).
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V. SMART SENTENCING: OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION AND SENTENCE
ADJUSTMENT
With some arm-twisting by the federal courts, California’s
realignment of criminal justice policy has been implemented. This
legislative response was not out of line with an undercurrent of
existing decisions that have taken advantage of laws permitting
sentence reductions and alternatives for vulnerable defendants.
The mental status or physical condition of a defendant can serve as
a defense to crime (e.g., mental disease or defect or physical
191
incapacity) and can mitigate or eliminate punishment, and to
some extent the criminal justice system factors in the sensitivity and
192
vulnerability of persons sent into the prison system.
The current calculus for setting prison sentences shows the
complete lack of a consistent rationale underlying penal laws. Get
“tough on crime” promises, while having political caché, have
exposed the inefficacy of lengthening sentences and terminating
opportunities for early release, hence the “smart on crime”
193
For example, the Wisconsin legislature has recently
approach.
been embroiled over a debate on whether to cut back on early
194
Considering this development,
release for its prisoners.
191. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 447–49 (discussing excuse defenses
based on physical or mental disabilities); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Downward Departure Under State Sentencing Guidelines Permitting Downward Departure
for Defendants with Significantly Reduced Mental Capacity, Including Alcohol or Drug
Dependency, 113 A.L.R.5TH 597 (2003); C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Comment
Note, Mental or Emotional Condition as Diminishing Responsibility for Crime, 22
A.L.R.3D 1228 (1968).
192. See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) (discussing the impact of incarceration on more
sensitive offenders, the importance of considering subjective experiences, and the
possibility of calibrating punishments).
193. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (Myrna Raeder ed.
2010) (“One area where the recession has had a major impact is in funding the
nation’s correctional infrastructure.
The sustained growth of the prison
population has now become too expensive for a number of states to sustain, which
many hope will bring a halt to the over-reliance on incarceration. The slogan that
we must be ‘smart on crime,’ rather than tough on crime reflects this financial
reality.”).
194. See Malcolm C. Young, Turning Back the Clock on Early Release, THE CRIME
REP. (June 8, 2011, 3:29 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/insidecriminal-justice/2011-06-turning-back-the-clock-on-early-release (“Some Wisconsin
politicians opposed ‘earned early release’ from the start. Now, with a new
governor and a shift in control in the legislature, the state’s lawmakers on June 8
approved a bill repealing Early Release. Gov. Scott Walker was expected to sign
the bill shortly thereafter.”). The Governor signed the bill the following month.
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Professor Malcolm Young observed that the fundamental problem
underlying all sentencing practices was based on two main
195
To start, prison sentence length was not based on
causes.
196
objective analysis but rather legislative impulsiveness and instinct.
The scale of sentences required to protect the public is
counterbalanced by the need to be “tough on crime” or respond to
197
the latest anti-crime campaign. Professor Young has also asserted
that the same ill-defined criteria are relied on by judges meting out
198
these sentences.
When a court can dole out punishment set in thousands of
199
years, what is the rationale underlying such an impossibility?
Why set a term of years that no human being could or should
200
201
It renders the entire sentencing scheme chimerical.
satisfy?
See Associated Press, Walker Signs Bill Doing Away With Early Release (Update),
WISLAWJOURNAL.COM
(July
19,
2011,
10:35
AM),
http://wislawjournal.com/2011/07/19/walker-to-sign-repeal-of-early-prisonrelease/.
195. Young, supra note 194.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Rapists Handed 32,500 Years in Jail, 15 LAW. WKLY. NEWS (Ont.,
Can.), Apr. 26, 1996 (“Allan Wayne McLaurin and Darron Bennalford Anderson
were convicted of the crimes in 1993, but that decision was overturned by the
Court of Criminal Appeal because it said the trial judge erroneously instructed the
jury that a defendant is ‘presumed not guilty,’ rather than ‘presumed innocent.’
In March, a nine-man, three-woman jury handed Mr. McLaurin a 21,250-year
sentence, and Mr. Anderson 11,250 years. A third man is still being sought.”).
200. See, e.g., Gabriel Falcon, ‘Lipstick Killer’ Behind Bars Since 1946, CNN (Oct.
24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-24/justice/illinois.lipstick.murders
_1_leopold-and-loeb-murderer-longest-serving-inmate?_s=PM:CRIME (“[Denied
parole numerous times, William Heirens] lives in the present and hopes for a
future outside prison. Supporters have championed his cause, convinced that he
is innocent, or arguing that he has been rehabilitated, a model inmate who has
served his sentence.”); Joseph Geringer, In the Shadow of Bill Heirens, TRUTV,
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/predators/heirens/heirens_1.
html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (describing the case of an Illinois man, William
Heirens, convicted of serial murder and incarcerated since 1946); see also Texas
Inmate Paroled After 60 Years, KTXS.COM (Dec. 18, 2011, 1:10 PM),
http://www.ktxs.com/news/30024628/detail.html (discussing Harvey Stewart, an
eighty-three year old inmate who is to be released on parole after serving sixty
years in prison—making him Texas’ longest serving offender. He is no longer
considered a threat to society according to Corrections officials.). “When he first
went to prison in 1951, gasoline was 20 cents a gallon, a postage stamp cost three
pennies and Harry Truman was [P]resident.” Id. The fear of life in prison and its
torments has on occasion overwhelmed a defendant at the sentencing stage. See,
e.g., Jennifer Emily, Man Slits His Throat in Dallas Courtroom After Judge Issues 40-Year
Sentence, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:58 AM), http://www.dallasnews
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Indeed, there can be no condign punishments under these laws,
which leads to the problem of justifying the length and conditions
of incarcerative punishment.
Carceral sentencing affects every facet of the person in the
202
dock, their personhood and roots in the outside world. And
achieving mental toughness is no justification for incarcerative
punishment. Prison life in general and solitary confinement in
203
The fact
particular have a corrosive effect on mental wellbeing.
that some persons might have the character to endure the
hardships of prison life is only a rationalization for the premise that
prison is appropriate for everyone. Suffering for its own sake is
only another ends justifying the means argument. There is no
logical or legal support for punishing people because they can take
it, but there is ample authority for prohibiting invidious
204
To borrow a principle from tort law, the justice
punishment.
205
and the
system must take defendants as they find them,
conditions of imprisonment should not be evaluated based on the
.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/20100831-Man-slits-his-throat-inDallas-5245.ece.
201. See Steven Drizin, Does Rehabilitation Matter Anymore? The Case of William
Heirens, BLUHM BLOG (July 31, 2007, 10:18 AM), http://blog.law.northwestern.edu
/bluhm/2007/07/index.html (“For the past 61 years, Heirens has been fighting
in the courts to establish his innocence. Although he has come close on several
occasions, relief has been denied in the courts, by a succession of Governors, and
by the Parole Boards. . . . He has been a model prisoner, a jailhouse lawyer who
has freed many others, an accomplished painter, and was the first inmate to earn a
four year college degree. Today, at age 78, Heirens is an obese diabetic who is
losing his eyesight and is confined to a wheelchair. He poses no threat to anyone
and is a good parole risk.”).
202. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.”).
203. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 325, 335 (2006); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary
Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104–05 (2010); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/mhppji.pdf.
204. See Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Comment Note—Length of Sentence as
Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33
A.L.R.3D 335 (1970).
205. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 31 (2010) (“When an actor’s tortious conduct causes harm to a person
that, because of a preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics
of the person, is of a greater magnitude or different type than might reasonably be
expected, the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all such harm to the
person.”).
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endurance of the few, but on the harm to everyone. The physical
and mental attributes ignored at sentencing and exacerbated by
prison conditions are subjecting thousands to penalties far in
excess of those intended by legislatures, or permitted by the
constitution.
The Eighth Amendment by its terms is concerned with
206
punishment and not conditions of confinement. However, those
conditions can become punitive when there is a serious deprivation
207
This is the
and deliberate indifference to suffering behind bars.
fundamental truth acknowledged by Justice Kennedy in Brown v.
Plata: “To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to
provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State
for food, clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to
provide sustenance for inmates ‘may actually produce physical
208
Thus, when the State defaults on
torture or a lingering death.’”
its obligation, the courts are obligated to address the State’s
209
failure.
Judges are also part of the continuum of a justice system whose
endpoint is the carceral state. There is an unbroken line from
arrest to judgment to punishment, putting some of the
210
The
responsibility on the criminal courts’ sentencing practices.
criminal trial judge’s role is confined to setting a term of years with
studied indifference to the conditions imposed by delegating to the
211
Conditions of confinement can
jailer its total administration.
become a categorical punishment as exemplified in Brown v. Plata.
206. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 885 (2009) (“[I]n the existing system, the crime determines
only the length of the prison sentence, not the conditions under which that
sentence will be served. Indeed, any harm prisoners suffer at the hands of the
state while incarcerated is typically wholly unrelated to their original offense.”
(footnote omitted)).
207. Id. at 891–92 (suggesting that the state has an affirmative duty to protect
the incarcerated since it is the state that confined them and since the government,
through legislative and regulatory policies, helped to create this hazardous
environment, and therefore must bear the “carceral burden”).
208. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
209. Id. at 1928–29.
210. See Dolovich, supra note 206, at 900–01.
211. Id. at 978 (“Just as prison officials learn cruelty through repeated
exposure to prisoners in a context that denies their shared humanity, judges
develop a cruel disposition toward prisoners through the repeated demand that
they validate as not cruel conditions that are clearly at odds with the state’s
carceral burden.”).
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At this point, civil rights litigation forces another court to step in
and define the proper conditions for incarceration. The question
is why punishment is bifurcated in this way. It results in excessive
punishment for the incarcerated and added administrative and
financial burdens for the State to correct problems that could have
212
been addressed at sentencing.
213
In view of the conditions engrained in prison life, judges
sometimes exercise their discretion to adjust sentences in
individual cases to balance the equities. Perhaps anticipating the
realignment concept that California has been compelled to
embrace, some judges have recognized that the conditions of
confinement amount to a punishment that might fall within the
214
proscription of the Eighth Amendment as applied to sentencing.
The prison experience and its conditions can be treated as a
mitigating sentencing factor for susceptible or vulnerable
215
There have been exceptions where a sentencing
individuals.
212. Cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 140 n.* (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“A prisoner’s sentence is the punishment imposed pursuant to state
law. Sentencing a criminal to a term of imprisonment may, under state law, carry
with it the implied delegation to prison officials to discipline and otherwise
supervise the criminal while he is incarcerated. Thus, restrictions imposed by
prison officials may also be a part of the sentence, provided that those officials are
not acting ultra vires with respect to the discretion given them, by implication, in
the sentence.”).
213. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1350 (6th Cir. 1974) (“Courts take
judicial notice that a general prison population includes criminals of all types,
young and old, dangerous, of every character. And the courts also particularly
take judicial notice that it is not uncommon to find the indiscriminate mixing of
hardened criminals, including sexual assaulters, with young offenders.”); United
States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In this district, defendants
are detained prior to and during trial in the Metropolitan Correction Center,
alongside criminals incarcerated subsequent to conviction pursuant to due process
of law. Overcrowded conditions were observed by this court in the course of its
inspection of the Center. Visiting hours and recreation are quite restricted.
Moreover, opportunities to meet with counsel and to examine tapes and written
documents, and to assist in preparation for trial, are severely limited. The court
may take judicial notice of such prison conditions affecting the administration of
justice.”).
214. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 10−12 (examining the common factors
that state courts with a body of “proportionality jurisprudence” have developed to
adjust sentences that are out of step with the principles of fair punishment);
Kennard R. Strutin, Mandatory Minimums, Life Sentences and the Eighth Amendment,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1994, at 6.
215. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that one of the proportionality
factors that courts have considered is the defendant’s criminal history, which
might be characterized as a “worthiness factor”). The defendant’s “worthiness” for
sentencing consideration is broader than his rap sheet. Thus, the concepts of
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guideline recognizes or a sentencing judge has recognized the
“cruel and unusual” nature of prison by adjusting the punishment
of particular offenders or taking into account the effects of the
216
Indeed, it
conditions of confinement on susceptible defendants.
is these exceptions that provide the foundation for a
reconceptualization of incarcerative punishment catalyzed by the
California realignment example.
The State of California
reinvented its sentencing laws in response to its prison population
problem, thereby informing and educating everyone in the
criminal justice system that conditions of confinement do matter in
setting punishment. They siphoned away non-violent, non-serious,
and non-sex offenders from state prison facilities. While their
rationale was formulated to satisfy a court-ordered population
reduction, the reality is a recognition that some persons should not
be sentenced to state prison or any prison. This conclusion has
already been reached by federal and state courts by taking into
account the “individual” character of the man or woman in the
dock and cognizance of the nature of the prison environment.
Federal law recognizes that there is room for individualized
217
Information
sentencing to arrive at an appropriate sentence.
that might reveal a defendant’s vulnerability inside prison is
especially important at the pretrial stage. One of the factors in
setting a penalty is whether the prison facility can provide a
218
The level of health care
defendant with adequate medical care.
available and the conditions of prison life should be determinative
in the length of an incarcerative sentence due to their impact on
dignity and personhood, which go beyond his criminal background or
vulnerability to harm, are facets that ought to be encompassed in a worthiness
factor analysis. See discussion supra notes 188−90 and accompanying text.
216. See Kolber, supra note 192, at 193−95; see, e.g., Lise Olsen, Former Federal
Judge Kent Calls Prison Unfair, ‘Cruel’, CHRON.COM (Aug. 3, 2010, 5:30 AM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Former-federal-judge-Kentcalls-prison-unfair-1718673.php (“As a prisoner, former U.S. District Judge Samuel
B. Kent has been shunted into solitary confinement, forced to hear the screams of
another inmate being raped and ordered by a ‘cruel’ sergeant in the Florida
prison system to do calisthenics in the nude, according to allegations in a federal
court memorandum filed Tuesday. Kent has requested that his 33-month
sentence be vacated and adjusted based on his allegations of inhumane and unfair
treatment.”).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006) (“No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2006).
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219

the defendant,
as prison has the potential of transforming
routine medical matters into the extraordinary by virtue of the
conditions inside.
One author has cataloged the variety of ailments and medical
conditions that have justified deviation from the formerly
220
And yet, the
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Guidelines’ downward departures were seldom invoked for these
221
After a series of cases dethroned the Guidelines, the
reasons.
issue of a defendant’s physical condition as an element of
222
Still, it is through the
sentencing has been litigated case-by-case.
lessons garnered from these individual cases that reforms in the
223
sentencing guidelines and procedures might find fruition.
Ultimately, policymakers have forced the courts to resolve the
tension between improving prison conditions and making
exceptions under the sentencing laws in individual cases,
224
California has
forestalling the need for widespread reforms.
219. See generally Penelope June Weller, The Right to Health: The Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 35 ALTERNATIVE. L.J. 66 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1935746 (discussing the Australian government’s
positive obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health of people in
custody).
220. See Stacey M. Studnicki, Individualized Sentencing: Federal Sentencing
Departures Based Upon Physical Condition, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1215, 1224, 1233−41
(1994).
221. Id. at 1217−18.
222. See generally Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Downward Departure Under § 5H1.4
of United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Permitting Downward Departure for
Extraordinary Physical Impairment, 16 A.L.R. FED. 2D 113 (2007) (“The fact that a
defendant has an illness, disease, or condition by itself does not constitute an
extraordinary physical impairment. It is the extent to which the illness, disease, or
condition has progressed, and the extent to which the Bureau of Prisons has the
medical personnel and facilities required to furnish a defendant with the care and
treatment he or she needs that will generally control.”).
223. Studnicki, supra note 220, at 1245 (footnote omitted) (“If courts fail to
depart on the belief that a departure is not permissible, the Sentencing
Commission may interpret this ‘judicial inaction as endorsement of the
appropriateness of the sentences scheduled under the Guidelines.’ In order to
guide future Guidelines’ amendments, the courts are obligated to create a record
so the Commission may see that departures, especially on the basis of
individualized factors, are appropriate and necessary.”).
224. See generally Alice Ristroph, Model Penal Code Symposium: How (Not) to Think
Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009) (discussing Model Penal Code
approaches to sentencing and the need for a judge-centered pragmatic sentencing
approach unshackled by retributivist (punishment) policies); Simon N. M. Young,
Justifying Sentencing Discounts for Foreigners, 31 H.K. L.J. 369 (2001) (discussing the
hardships experienced by foreign defendants serving time in Hong Kong jail as a
factor in sentence mitigation, which should be accommodated through a
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chosen a third approach by staunching the flow of offenders into
the state prison system and moving them into the local jail system,
using home monitoring, or utilizing other alternative avenues, and
despite the Supreme Court’s order, has avoided releasing current
225
state prisoners or even transferring them to local facilities.
Pursuing a realignment approach to its fullest extent, in order to
avoid the unconstitutional consequences of overcrowding in state
prisons, could lead to a system where every individual facing
incarceration would receive a medical and mental evaluation as
part of the presentence report preparation and could introduce
expert testimony at a sentencing hearing to advise the court about
the best disposition and placement (classification) of that individual
226
within the penal system or a non-carcerative alternative.
The conditions in prison are also reflected, perhaps
intensified, in the local jails where defendants are held temporarily
awaiting disposition, serve short sentences, and await transfer to
227
As noted earlier, this might become an
prison for longer terms.
important factor in the implementation of California’s realignment
plan, which calls for extensive reliance on local facilities in lieu of
state prisons.
The catalog of issues in local jails touches all aspects of an
inmate’s life, much as it would in state prisons. One challenge
faced by inmates is the conundrum facing large persons due to the
inadequacy of the jailhouse diet and the difficulty of inhabiting
228
cramped living spaces. In Arkansas, an inmate awaiting trial filed
proportionality analysis).
225. See Get Ready, California Counties, Here Come the Inmates, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-re-entry20110830 (observing that rehabilitation and reentry get little attention as
California counties struggle with the financial consequences of the new legislative
mandate to route more prisoners through local jails and community facilities).
226. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
as to Appropriate Punishment for Convicted Defendant, 47 A.L.R.4TH 1069 (1986)
(analyzing state and federal cases that discuss the admissibility of expert or
psychiatric testimony affecting criminal sentencing).
227. See TODD D. MINTON, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim10st.pdf (describing national jail
populations and the various purposes served by incarceration in local facilities
(e.g., awaiting trial or disposition, temporary holding for parole and probation
violators, or serving short-term sentences)).
228. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 639, 687–88 (1993) (collecting decisions where the problematic living
conditions in jails, as well as prisons, have been litigated); Lizette Alvarez, Soy Diet
Is Cruel and Unusual, Florida Inmate Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A13; Tovin
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a lawsuit claiming that the detention center diet was so deficient
229
Physical or mental
that he was “literally being starved to death.”
issues can render someone unfit for prison because he is already
230
confined by his body or mind.
Vulnerability to cruel punishment, a front-end Eighth
Amendment argument, reflects the fears and realities of prison
conditions present in all cases and acknowledged by the Court in
Plata. These are chronic conditions faced by inmates and those to
be sentenced to incarceration. Thus, legislatures might account
for, a court could take judicial notice of, or a defense lawyer might
raise awareness of, the full spectrum of prison life: susceptibility to
231
232
233
sexual abuse and rape;
poor living conditions;
abuse;
Lapan, When Inmates Act Out, the Loaf Is Served, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Dec. 17,
2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/rss/ci_16886434 (describing
correctional officials’ use of “disciplinary diet loaf, prison loaf and management
loaf” to punish misbehaving inmates).
229. See 300-Pound Inmate Complains Ark. Jail Doesn’t Feed Him Well, USA TODAY
(Apr. 28, 2008, 10:55 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-0428-2668992449_x.htm (“Broderick Lloyd Laswell says he isn’t happy that he’s
down to 308 pounds after eight months in the Benton County jail. He has filed a
federal lawsuit complaining the jail doesn’t provide inmates with enough food. . . .
‘If we are in a small pod all day (and) do next to nothing for physical exercise, we
should not lose weight,’ the suit says. ‘The only reason we lost weight in here is
because we are literally being starved to death.’”). However, under the federal
sentencing guidelines in the United States, morbid obesity does not automatically
qualify as an “extraordinary physical impairment” for a downward departure
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.4. See, e.g., United States v.
Washington, 467 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying an application for downward
sentence departure based on the defendant’s weight loss from about 800 pounds
at arrest to 574 pounds at sentencing).
230. See, e.g., Paul Sims, Agoraphobic Who Made So Much in Benefits He Ran Illegal
Loans Business Escapes Trial Because He’s ‘Scared To Leave His House’, MAILONLINE
(June 22, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2006390
/Middlesborough-man-Colin-Watson-got-benefits-cash-lent-friends-escapes-trialhes-scared-leaving-home.html (“His agoraphobia was said to be so bad he cannot
leave his one-bedroom home to go to court and the case against him was
reluctantly dropped by Judge Peter Fox, QC.”).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Parish, 308 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A
defendant’s unusual susceptibility to abuse by other inmates while in prison may
warrant a downward departure. The district court found that Parish was
susceptible to abuse in prison because of a ‘combination’ of factors: ‘his stature,
his demeanor, his naivete, [and] the nature of the offense.’” (citations omitted)).
232. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE OF FEDERAL INMATES (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0504/final.pdf (critiquing the deficiencies in
federal laws criminalizing prison staff sexual relations with inmates); ALLEN J. BECK
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION
IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09 6 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf (“Among the 76,459
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235

psychological harm; geriatric related problems; and inhumane
236
Other illustrative bases for exceptions to
treatment by officials.
incarcerative punishment and acknowledgement of the conditions
of confinement have been found in the following areas: sexual
237
238
targets; sexual orientation and gender reassignment; ability to
inmates participating in the NIS-2 sexual victimization survey, 2,861 reported
experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization in the past 12 months,
or since admission to the facility, if less than 12 months.”).
233. See, e.g., David B. Caruso, Anne Hathaway’s Ex-Boyfriend Not Enjoying Prison,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 13, 2008, 11:22 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html
/entertainment/2008386905_apvaticamscamfollieri.html (“[Raffaello] Follieri’s
lawyer sent a letter to a judge this week complaining about the facility. ‘Mr.
Follieri reports that he is in a windowless dormitory with approximately 120 other
men,’ the letter said. ‘He says that he cannot eat because the food appears to be
spoiled and that the toilet and shower facilities are unspeakably unsanitary[,] e.g.,
there is excrement in the shower and rats are roaming freely in the area. He says
the stench is intolerable.’ The lawyer, Flora Edwards, said things are so bad, it has
made Follieri ill. So far he has had a fever, blood in his urine, intestinal problems
and shortness of breath. Edwards asked the judge to have the 30-year-old
transferred back to the federal jail in Manhattan where he was previously held.
The judge asked the government to look into Follieri’s complaints.”).
234. See Jeffrey Kluger, Are Prisons Driving Prisoners Mad?, TIME (Jan. 26, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1582304,00.html (“The U.S.
holds about 2 million people under lock and key, and 20,000 of them are confined
in the 31 supermaxes operated by the states and the Federal Government. That
may represent only 1% of the inmate population, but it’s a volatile 1%. Push any
punishment too far and mental breakdown—or at least a claim of mental
breakdown—is sure to follow.”).
235. See generally John D. Burrow & Barbara A. Koons-Witt, Elderly Status,
Extraordinary Physical Impairments and Intercircuit Variation Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 11 ELDER L.J. 273 (2003) (proposing that prisoners’ elderly status be
considered as part of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Timothy Curtin, The
Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison Population and the Search for a CostEffective and Socially Acceptable Means of Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007)
(evaluating the challenges of accommodating elderly inmates).
236. See, e.g., Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 2010) (involving a §
1983 action filed by a pretrial detainee against local sheriff for transporting him
from the court to the jail in a dog cage in a K-9 vehicle); Johnson Frees Woman
Abused by Jail Guards, FREE REPUBLIC (May 31, 2002, 12:53 PM),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/692629/posts (“Gov. Gary Johnson
took the rare step Thursday of commuting the six-year sentence of an inmate—a
woman sexually assaulted by Doña County jail guards while incarcerated for creditcard fraud.”).
237. See, e.g., Jail a Risk for Thin, White Man, Judge Rules, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan.
7, 2001, at B-5 (“Hillsborough County Judge Florence Foster sent Paul Hamill, 41,
to a treatment center and put him on two years’ probation. He was being
sentenced for violating probation on a previous cocaine conviction. ‘He’s a small,
thin, white man with curly dark hair, and I suspect he would certainly become a
sexual target in the Florida state prison system,’ Foster said, according to a
transcript of the November sentencing hearing. ‘I’ve been told they can’t protect
people like that. I’m not going to send a man like this to Florida state prison.
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physical challenges;

242

That is cruel and unusual punishment in my book,’ she said.”); see also Robert
Gavin, Cruel, but Not Unusual, TIMES UNION, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1, available at
http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?oneimage&imageid=1
0070757 (“Behind the walls of Great Meadow Correctional Facility, less than 75
miles from the state Capitol, an old stereotype remains hauntingly true: Go to
prison, risk rape. The maximum-security lockup in Washington County ranked
fifth worst nationwide in the most recent study of the prevalence of sexual assault
in U.S. prisons—and convicted criminals housed there were only part of the
problem.”). See generally United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 525–26 (2d Cir.
1991) (“At sentencing, the court found that Gonzalez had a ‘feminine cast to his
face and a softness of features which will make him prey to the long-term criminals
with whom he will be associated in prison.’ Relying on our decision in United States
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990), which held that ‘extreme vulnerability of a
criminal defendant is a proper ground for departure,’ the court concluded that a
downward departure was appropriate to ensure Gonzalez’s safety, and therefore
reduced Gonzalez’s sentence to one-third of the normally applicable minimum
term.” (citation omitted)).
238. See, e.g., Jail for Gay, Transgender Inmates to Close, USA TODAY (Dec. 29,
2005, 7:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-12-29-rikersinmates_x.htm (“One of the nation’s few jail dormitories specifically for gay or
transgender prisoners is closing on Rikers Island, prompting complaints from
some activists who say it is a needed safe haven.”); Purna Nemani, Woman Locked in
NEWS
SERVICE
(Dec.
8,
2010),
a
Men’s
Prison,
COURTHOUSE
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/12/08/32413.htm (“A hermaphrodite
who underwent surgery to become a woman claims Hawaii incarcerated her in a
men’s prison where she was, predictably, raped. The 33-year-old woman says the
state locked her up in its largest men’s prison despite her repeated protests during
intake that she is a woman.”); Tom Whitehead, Transsexual Prisoner Wins Right to Be
in Female Prison, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2009, 1:35 PM), http://www.telegraph
.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/6138325/Transsexual-prisoner-wins-right-tobe-in-female-prison.html (“Lawyers for the 27-year-old inmate, who is still at the
preoperative stage, described her as a ‘woman trapped inside a man’s body’ and
argued keeping her among men was preventing her from having a full sex
change.”).
239. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/us/29jail.html
?pagewanted=all (“For roughly $75 to $127 a day, these [California] convicts—who
are known in the self-pay parlance as ‘clients’—get a small cell behind a regular
door, distance of some amplitude from violent offenders and, in some cases, the
right to bring an iPod or computer on which to compose a novel, or perhaps a
song.”). See generally Symposium, Pay-to-Stay Programs in Correctional Facilities, 106
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org
/assets/fi/106/paytostay.pdf.
240. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/19judges.html
?pagewanted=all (“For someone convicted of endangering the welfare of a child,
for instance, a judge might now learn that a three-year prison sentence would run
more than $37,000 while probation would cost $6,770. A second-degree robbery,
a judge could be told, would carry a price tag of less than $9,000 for five years of
intensive probation, but more than $50,000 for a comparable prison sentence and
parole afterward. The bill for a murderer’s 30-year prison term: $504,690.”);
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and family ties.

245

Jennifer Medina, In California, a Plan to Charge Inmates for Their Stay, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/us/in-riverside-californiaa-plan-to-charge-inmates.html (“Soon, a twin metal bunk at the county jail, with
meals served on plastic trays, will run $142.42.”); see also Annual Determination of
Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,081 (proposed Sept. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-15/pdf/2011-23689.pdf
(containing the Department of Justice’s average cost of incarceration for the year
2010); Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1963506 (advocating for judges
taking financial costs into consideration when sentencing); Chad Flanders, Cost as
a Sentencing Factor: A Theoretical Inquiry, (Saint Louis Univ. Legal Studies Research,
Working Paper No. 2011-23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920274
(discussing whether Missouri judges should take the cost of incarceration into
consideration when sentencing).
241. See, e.g., United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“This case illustrates some of the troubling problems in sentencing adolescents
who download child pornography on a file-sharing computer service. Posed is the
question: To protect the public and the abused children who are shown in a
sexually explicit manner in computer images, do we need to destroy defendants
like C.R.?”).
242. See, e.g., Dan Herbeck, Quadriplegic Spared Prison in Child Porn Case,
BUFFALONEWS.COM (Aug. 20, 2010, 6:42 PM), http://www.buffalonews.com
/incoming/article130071.ece (“43-year-old Allegany County man who was using a
credit card to buy images from child porn Web sites: Schifelbine is a quadriplegic.
He cannot walk, requires 24-hour nursing care and spends all his time in his bed
or wheelchair. After hearing about his physical disabilities, U. S. Attorney
Terrance P. Flynn decided to offer the Belmont man an agreement that would
carry no criminal conviction or prison time. Schifelbine, however, will forfeit
$50,000 to the federal government and his use of the Internet will be restricted.”).
243. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 735 N.W.2d 818, 830 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007)
(“Thompson stands 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighs 125 to 130 pounds.
Thompson’s size and how that ‘physical condition’ will affect him in a prison
setting is a relevant consideration. However, given other matters found in the PSI,
which matters we will detail shortly, we have no doubt that Thompson’s physical
stature, although specifically mentioned, was but a minor point in the trial court’s
sentencing decision.”); Scott Bauer, Sentence for Short Sex Offender Draws Fire, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2006, 10:50 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052600177.html (“Cheyenne County
District Judge Kristine Cecava . . . told Richard W. Thompson that his crimes
deserved a long prison sentence but that he was too small to survive in a state
prison. Joe Mangano, secretary of the National Organization of Short Statured
Adults, agreed with the judge’s assessment that Thompson would face dangers
while in prison because of his height.”).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Joyeros, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“This case illustrates the danger of due process violations by intensive pressure on
defendants to plead guilty because of lengthy pretrial incarcerations and the offer
of advantageous deals for lesser terms of imprisonment.”); United States v. Francis,
129 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted) (“Although
departures based on conditions of confinement are not encouraged by the
Guidelines, they also are not discouraged; in fact, conditions of confinement is an
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This proliferation of problems argues in favor of a general
realignment like the one pursued in California. Indeed, these
individual issues cumulatively reflect the need to broadly realign
sentencing to avoid punitive conditions in federal and state prisons.
Thus, new policies ought to broadly and consistently allow for the
consideration of individual risk factors in conjunction with the
disclosure and consideration of prison conditions at the sentencing
246
stage.
VI. EFFECTUATING THE EXPOSURE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
While not everyone will have the same prison experience, they
will face the same conditions upon arrival. And those conditions
are a direct result of the sentence imposed. As the cases below
illustrate, judges have little or no power to affect those conditions.
Until there is a merger between the penal law governing
punishment and the corrections statutes superintending prison
administration, judges can only set and pronounce numerical
247
Ultimately, the better policy might involve the
sentences.

unmentioned factor . . . .Therefore, conditions of confinement below those in
federal institutions provide grounds for a departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.”).
245. See, for example, the cases collected in United States v. Bailey, 369 F.
Supp. 2d 1090, 1101–03 (D. Neb. 2005) (“Thus, although family ties are ordinarily
not relevant, once in a great while they provide a reason for a reduced sentence.”).
246. The intensity of punishment should be considered for particular cases
such as victim-defendants—for example, victims of domestic violence who in turn
have been charged with crimes against their abusive spouses or partners.
According to one study the majority of incarcerated women are “survivordefendants.” See, e.g., CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. AVON GLOBAL CTR. FOR WOMEN AND
JUSTICE & THE WOMEN IN PRISON PROJECT OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASS’N OF N.Y.,
FROM PROTECTION TO PUNISHMENT: POST-CONVICTION BARRIERS TO JUSTICE FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVOR-DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK STATE (2011), available at
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/From-Protection-toPunishment-Report.pdf (addressing the injustices victim-defendants face within
the legal system). This has led to the introduction of legislation in New York to
adjust the sentence to fit the offender (i.e., institutionalized leniency). See S. Res.
5436, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://m.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bill/S5436-2011 (relating to sentencing and resentencing in
domestic violence cases); Shorter Prison Time Sought for Abused Women in NY,
LONGISLANDPRESS.COM (June 13, 2011), http://www.longislandpress.com/2011
/06/13/shorter-prison-time-sought-for-abused-women-in-ny/. This is the first
legislation of its kind to remove impediments to sentencing that have not been
remedied by clemency grants or early release on parole.
247. See discussion supra Part V.
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248

consultation with or appointment of special sentencing counsel
or requirement of a corrections consultant as in death penalty
249
cases where the sentence plays a central role. However, that
policy must begin with legislation that empowers and enables trial
judges to be informed about the effects of the prison sentences that
they impose.
Such a policy should give judges reasonable
discretion to modify that sentence or have input into a defendant’s
classification within the correctional system, as the realignment
approach discussed above would allow. The interconnectedness of
penal sentences and prison conditions might best be shown by
examining interactions between courts and correctional authorities
as judges attempt to consider the prison environment in
250
determining how a defendant ought to serve his or her time.
A. Judges and Jailers
In 1983, Ernesto “Tony” Insignares was indicted for selling less
than two ounces of cocaine to an undercover New York City police
251
252
The judge released him on $200.00 bail.
At trial,
officer.
Insignares took the witness stand and claimed that he was only

248. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien,
the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse
consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an
immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.” (emphasis added));
Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461
(2011) (exploring the rights to specialized counsel in deportation cases); STEERING
COMM. OF THE N.Y. IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY REPORT ET AL., ACCESSING
JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
6-14 (2011), available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo
/NYIRS_Report.pdf.
249. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
as to Appropriate Punishment for Convicted Defendant, 47 A.L.R.4TH 1069 (1986)
(discussing the admissibility for sentencing purposes of expert evidence on
circumstances of dangerousness); Jules Epstein, Mandatory Mitigation: An Eighth
Amendment Mandate to Require Presentation of Mitigation Evidence, Even When the
Sentencing Trial Defendant Wishes to Die, TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928052.
250. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 29. Legislatures cannot predict the
innumerable ways that penal and sentencing laws might be applied, resulting in
some contradictory and conflicting outcomes, but a law that empowered judges to
take proportionality into account would go a long way toward addressing this
conundrum. Id.
251. See People v. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
252. Id.
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delivering the package on behalf of a friend, his co-defendant, and
253
was unaware that it contained illegal drugs. Nonetheless, the jury
convicted him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
254
At this point, presiding Justice Hornblass
second degree.
remanded Insignares to Rikers Island until sentencing as was
255
Based on his observations of the defendant
required by law.
during trial, the judge became concerned about Insignares’ ability
to endure jail, so he ordered the correction officers to place him in
256
administrative segregation and on a suicide watch.
Once in Rikers Island, the defendant was placed in a holding
257
pen along with two dozen other inmates. Insignares picked out a
258
corner of the cell and went to sleep. Soon after, he was sexually
assaulted by five other prisoners who also threatened his life should
259
At his next court appearance several
he reveal what happened.
days later, Insignares told the court about it, as well as a failed
260
suicide attempt after the attack. Confirming these claims, Justice
Hornblass was disturbed that the New York Department of
261
They believed the
Corrections had ignored his custody orders.
court exceeded its authority over a matter solely within the
262
bailiwick of prison administration.
A turf war broke out.
The court ordered Insignares
transferred to Bellevue Hospital for observation; however, the
Commissioner of Corrections obtained a superseding order from
the administrative judge to keep the defendant in Rikers Island
263
Hospital. Discovering the change in his orders, Justice Hornblass
visited the defendant at Rikers and reviewed the scene of his earlier
264
265
Meanwhile, Insignares’ attorney filed a Clayton motion
attack.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.40(3) (2011).
256. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
257. Id. at 516.
258. Id.
259. Id. (“Two of the inmates silenced and held him down on the floor while
the other three forcibly sodomized him anally.”).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. A Clayton motion appeals to the discretionary power of the criminal
court to dismiss an indictment “in furtherance of justice.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
210.40(1) (2011). It is an equitable option that allows the court to dismiss a case
even where no reason exists “as a matter of law.” Id. To rectify an injustice
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to dismiss the conviction against him in the interests of justice
266
The court conducted an
based on the sexual assault in Rikers.
exhaustive hearing that produced more than 2,100 pages of
267
transcripts.
268
Applying the
The yard stick for a Clayton motion is fairness.
statutory criteria, Justice Hornblass reviewed Insignares’ character
269
Then he
and personal history and found them to be admirable.
considered any misconduct by law enforcement before and after
270
Most notable was the Department of Corrections’
conviction.
failure to abide by the judge’s order for the defendant’s safety and
well-being. He noted:
Inmates have a due process right secured by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments that entails reasonable
protection from acts of violence and sexual assault
perpetrated by fellow inmates. Prison officials have a
correlative duty to exercise “reasonable care to prevent
prisoners from intentionally harming others or from
271
creating an unreasonable risk of harm.”
Balancing the rights of prisoners with the duties of prison
officials to oversee their safety, along with the Department of
Corrections’ refusal to take precautions specifically requested by
the court, Justice Hornblass concluded that Insignares was entitled
to be kept safe from harm while inside prison walls and that the
Department of Corrections had a higher duty because there was a
court order requiring additional precautions, which it failed to
272
follow.
Another important criterion considered by the court was the
purpose and effect of the sentence. A number of experts appeared
without a legal remedy, the judge must find a “compelling factor” from among the
ten statutory criteria, which address the seriousness of the crime, defendant’s
background, impact on the community and the justice system, and most notably
“the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized
for the offense.” Id.; see also People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973). See generally John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York’s “Interests of
Justice” Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175 (1994) (discussing New York’s unique
“dismissal in the interests of justice” application in the overloaded criminal justice
system).
266. Insignares, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 517.
269. Id. at 517–18.
270. Id. at 518.
271. Id. (citation omitted).
272. Id.
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at the hearing to discuss the impact of prison conditions, including
273
They testified that Insignares
two court-appointed psychiatrists.
lacked the survival skills required for prison life and that the
punishment he had already endured was sufficient deterrence;
moreover, continued incarceration would result in mental trauma
274
The prosecution experts
and the need for psychiatric care.
presented contrary testimony founded mainly on their disbelief
275
Justice
that the defendant had been sexually assaulted.
Hornblass found that defendant’s experiences in jail were a
sufficient deterrent to future criminality, his victimization by other
inmates harmed him physically and psychologically, the spotlight
shone on his case increased his vulnerability to attack while in
Rikers, and that he was no longer mentally able to survive the
276
prison experience. Since the rape occurred while Insignares was
a pretrial detainee and thus at a time where he was under the
control of the Department of Corrections, it became a crucial
277
Finally, the court rejected prosecution
sentencing factor.
278
arguments that the rape never happened.
The conduct of the Departmen of Corrections and the
physical and psychological injuries inflicted on Insignares
279
The
compelled Justice Hornblass to dismiss the indictment.
judge was satisfied that the mandatory three years to life in prison
was unnecessary in light of the time already served (nine months in
280
The court explained its
Rikers) and defendant’s experiences.
rationale in light of the greater purposes of punishment and its
societal benefits: (1) defendant had been sexually attacked in jail
awaiting sentence, (2) Insignares, like anyone convicted of a crime,
had the right to expect “humane confinement,” (3) his treatment
in jail went beyond the scope of any lawful penalty, (4) the danger
to the defendant would have been preventable if the Department
of Corrections had followed the court’s order, and (5) Insignares
273. Id. (“Prison administrators, social scientists, and other experts in the field
of penology testified to prison conditions generally and how the defendant would
fare in the prison environment.”).
274. Id. at 519.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 519–20.
277. Id. at 519 (“‘The infliction of punishment, particularly where its severity
serves no valid penological purpose, is cruel and inhuman.’” (quoting People v.
Askew, 403 N.Y.S.2d 959, 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978))).
278. Id. at 519–20.
279. Id. at 521.
280. Id. at 520.
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suffered long-term emotional and psychological harm as a result.
This decision was reversed on appeal and remanded for
282
The Appellate Division believed that Justice
resentencing.
Hornblass abused his discretion in dismissing the indictment by
failing to evaluate the Clayton evidence fairly as between the State
283
Their reevaluation of the criteria led to a
and the defendant.
different result. The appellate court found that crime was more
serious and detrimental to the community than the trial court
described, and evidence of Insignares’ participation in the drug
284
Moreover, the post-conviction
sale was overwhelming.
misconduct by the Department of Corrections had no bearing on
285
This last point was the most important, as the
the sentence.
court held that there was no relation to the harm inflicted on
Insignares while in custody and his sentence; there was no room for
286
His only
discretion to relieve him of his mandatory punishment.
remedies were a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the Department of Corrections or a request for administrative
287
segregation.
The trial judge in Insignares attempted to take into account the
infliction of harms caused by jail and prison conditions in order to
arrive at an equitable result. Extending the harm of incarceration
for Insignares to a minimum of three years, as mandated by state
law, seemed counterproductive in view of the defendant’s character
and suffering. However, on appeal, the War on Drugs took
precedence—a war that has played a significant role in prison
288
inflation. The defendant’s participation in the selling of cocaine
281. Id.
282. See People v. Insignares, 491 N.Y.S.2d 166, 175–76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
283. Id. at 173.
284. Id. at 174.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 175.
288. See generally Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug
War: A Penological and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 17–18
(2010) (footnotes omitted) (“The explosion in our prison population began in
1973, the same year President Nixon declared war on drugs . . . . There is much
speculation about the causes of this mass imprisonment mania, but the
mechanisms by which mass imprisonment was accomplished are clear. We have
continued to arrest people at about the same rate since 1973, but since then we
have sentenced those we convict to prison, for much longer terms, with fewer
opportunities for parole or early release than in previous years. When we do
release someone on parole, we revoke parole and return the parolee to prison
more often than we formerly did. That explains how we increased our prison
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and the effects his involvement had on society were found to be
paramount, and any deviation from the sentencing law was held to
be an abuse of discretion. The rape of the defendant by fellow
inmates, his nine months spent in jail before trial, and his
otherwise steady life were irrelevant.
The Insignares case illustrates the change in priorities from
rehabilitation and constructive punishments to retribution and
punitive isolation without regard to prison conditions. This theme
289
oppressive prison
pervades the truth-in-sentencing laws,
290
291
administration, and nearly automatic parole board denials.
population eightfold; why we did it is less obvious.”).
289. See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST., THE INFLUENCE OF TRUTH-INSENTENCING REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON
POPULATIONS (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410470
_FINALTISrpt.pdf.
290. See Enhanced Screening of BOP Correctional Officer Candidates Could Reduce
Likelihood of Misconduct, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/oig
/reports/2011/e1102.pdf (describing how improvements made in the Bureau of
Prisons’ hiring process have reduced the likelihood of officer misconduct and
recommending that the Bureau develop a scoring mechanism for assessing the
suitability of officer applicants); Tanyika Brime, We Can Do Better: The State of
Custodial Misconduct by Correctional Staff in New York, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GEN. 303
(2009) (analyzing a New York custodial sexual misconduct statute and suggesting
policy changes to better safeguard inmates); Andrea Jacobs, Prison Power Corrupts
Absolutely: Exploring the Phenomenon of Prison Guard Brutality and the Need to Develop a
System of Accountability, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (2004) (analyzing the problems
inherent in requiring inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before
bringing grievances for inmate abuse to district court). In addition to the
inherent systemic problems with administration of prisons, “compassion fatigue” is
an inescapable constant. See Andrew Nolen, Compassion Fatigue and Corrections
Officers, CORRECTIONS.COM (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.corrections.com/news
/article/27036-compassion-fatigue-and-corrections-officers (“Compassion fatigue
is defined as ‘the formal caregivers [sic] reduced capacity or interest in being
empathic or bearing the suffering of clients and is the natural consequent
behaviors and emotions resulting from knowing about a traumatizing event
experience[d] or suffered by a person’ . . . . It is the ‘reduced capacity or interest
in being empathic’ that we can distinctly attribute to Corrections Officers.”
(citation omitted)).
291. See, e.g., Joey Hipolito, In Re Lawrence: Preserving the Possibility of Parole for
California Prisoners, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2009) (discussing a California Supreme
Court decision that held evidence for denial of parole must be rationally related to
the inmate’s “current dangerousness”); John Caher, Law Requires Board to Access
30,
2011),
Rehabilitation in Parole Rulings,
N.Y. L.J. 1 (Sept.
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202517412972&slretur
n=1 (discussing application of a New York law requiring parole boards to establish
whether an inmate has been rehabilitated in determining parole decisions).
Another factor in the administration of all incarceration policies is “decision
fatigue,” or determinations based on non-legal reasoning. See Shai Danzigera et
al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011),
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Before conviction, defendants might challenge a sentence on
Eighth Amendment grounds that it is excessive or
292
disproportionate; and only after conviction can the conditions of
confinement be challenged as a “cruel or unusual punishment.”
But, as the Insignares case and many others illustrate, there should
be no dividing line between a sentence of imprisonment and the
conditions connected with its service. Sentencing judges can take
into consideration the harm that will befall a defendant after
incarceration, and some guidelines recognize this reality explicitly
in the context of vulnerable defendants. It follows that judges
should be able to take Eighth Amendment humane punishment
principles into consideration when calculating someone’s sentence.
293
In United States v. Corozzo, the defendant, a sixty-nine-year-old
captain in an organized crime family, faced more than thirteen
years behind bars. Under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), the
United States Attorney requested that the court impose a condition
on the defendant’s imprisonment and supervised release that
would curtail his ability to communicate with relatives who had
294
criminal records or associate with organized crime members.
Judge Weinstein, who presided over the matter, noted that the
295
statute was discretionary and rarely used.
Ultimately, the court agreed with the defense’s rationale that
such a condition, without probable cause to believe that the
defendant would conduct criminal business from inside, was
296
In reaching this
tantamount to de facto solitary confinement.
conclusion, Judge Weinstein took into account the historical
record of institutionalized prison cruelty. Among the examples of
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf (presenting
evidence that judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous factors that should not
impact legal decisions); John Tierney, Do You Suffer from Decision Fatigue?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-yousuffer-from-decision-fatigue.html?pagewanted=all (discussing study of parolegranting practices in Israeli prisons that varied according to the time of day).
292. See generally Blake J. Delaney, A Cruel and Unusual Application of the
Proportionality Principle in Eighth Amendment Analysis: Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11 (2003), 56 FLA. L. REV. 459, 460–64 (2003) (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s history of proportionality review in light of its decision to uphold a
sentence under California’s three strikes law in Ewing); Howard J. Alperin,
Annotation, Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3D 335 (1970).
293. 256 F.R.D. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
294. Id. at 399.
295. Id. at 401.
296. Id.
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“unimaginably cruel conditions” behind bars, the judge took note
of the American prisoners packed like sardines in British prison
ships during the Revolutionary War and the tens of thousands of
Union soldiers confined during the Civil War in Andersonville who
297
died from “disease, exposure and starvation.”
After recounting the horrors of enemy prison camps during
the Second World War and the Korean Conflict, Judge Weinstein
concluded by observing that when the government seeks to
enhance a sentence by aggravating the conditions of confinement,
the sentencing judge is duty-bound to take into account the history
298
of treatment behind bars and the mandate of “justice for all.”
The calculus undertaken by Judge Weinstein in Corozzo and
Judge Hornblass in Insignares demonstrates the value that might
spring from including a prison conditions factor in sentencing
policies. However, as Insignares highlights, there can be conflict
between the judge and prison officials. Thus, in the context of a
broader sentencing realignment like that proposed above, it would
be important to include specific policies that ensure that a judge’s
consideration of prison conditions and a judge’s order requiring
certain protocol with respect to a defendant would be adhered to
by corrections officials so that prison regulations and actions of
corrections officials do not trump the intent of the sentencing
299
court or the legislature that drafted the penal statutes.
B. Transparency and Disclosure
In addition to policies that would effectuate judicial
consideration of prison conditions at the sentencing stage, efforts
should be made to ensure that other actors in the criminal justice
system and members of the public pay more attention to prison
conditions. These are especially relevant steps in light of the
Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata. The case illustrates the difficulty
that states are having in improving the conditions of confinement
on an ad hoc basis, whether due to lack of political will or consensus
297. Id. at 399–400.
298. Id. at 400.
299. See, e.g., Garner v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 362
(2008). The sentencing judge failed to advise defendant about the five year postrelease supervision (PRS) term and so the Department of Correctional Services
(DOCS) imposed it administratively. Id. at 360. Challenging a violation of the
PRS, the Court of Appeals held that only the sentencing judge had the authority to
impose the PRS and the DOCS exceeded its jurisdiction. Id. at 362.
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on budgetary priorities. In Plata, prison population reduction was
a powerful and lawful remedy that was resorted to after years of
litigation. From a policy perspective, a more useful approach
300
This
might be for each state to set limits on prison populations.
per-capita cap policy (based on a percentage of the national prison
census) is a first step suggested by Professor Lynn Branham in her
article discussing a multi-faceted plan for changing the mindset
301
Her next step is to
behind current carceral practices.
recommend a program for monitoring and publishing information
302
about the conditions of confinement, that is, a move towards
transparency.
303
The “transparency and accountability plan” she envisioned is
304
rooted in the work of the American Bar Association and other
305
In essence, enabling legislation in each state and
organizations.
the federal government would create an independent monitoring
306
This
agency to investigate and report on prison conditions.
information would be made available online, and sent to the media
300. See Lynn S. Branham, “The Mess We’re in”: Five Steps Towards the
Transformation of Prison Cultures, 44 IND. L. REV. 703, 707–13 (2011) (suggesting a
fifty percent cap on the states’ per capita rate of imprisonment as a first step in
changing society’s approach to corrections administration); cf. Cara Anna & David
Udell, Op-Ed., We Need a National Justice Index, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202534218778&We_need_a_
national_Justice_Index&slreturn=1 (discussing a proposal for ranking states by
surveying and then publishing data on resources for indigent representation in
criminal and civil systems, which would be made available to legislators, courts and
the media); NAT’L CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, http://www.ncforaj.org (last
visited Mar. 28, 2012) (discussing the Center’s efforts to make courts “accessible
and fair”).
301. Branham, supra note 300, at 707–10.
302. Id. at 713–18.
303. Id. at 714.
304. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS 67–70 (3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_midy
ear2010_102i.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing accountability and oversight in Part
XI); CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 105B REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/2011a_resolution_105b.authcheckda
m.pdf (adopting “Key Requirements for the Certification of Correctional
Accrediting Entities,” which include transparency and accountability
requirements).
305. Branham, supra note 300, at 714 n.30; see also Ken Strutin, Criminal Justice
Resources: Prisoners’ Rights and Resources on the Web, LLRX.COM (Nov. 3, 2006),
http://www.llrx.com/features/prisonersrights.htm (noting sources of prison
standards).
306. Branham, supra note 300, at 714.
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307

and to legislators.
And in response to these reports, prison
administrators would be required to respond with action plans for
308
improvements.
The Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata highlighted numerous
sources that can be mined for information on the conditions of
confinement (past and present) as well as standards for bringing
them up to constitutional levels. Among the sources that ought to
309
be developed and consulted are: legislative impact statements;
310
sentencing or correction commission reports; judicial monitor
311
312
reports under the PLRA; Executive Orders; agency and quasi313
314
315
agency reports; academic and private studies; and surveys of
316
Regardless of the information
prisoners and other stakeholders.
307. Id. at 717.
308. Id. at 718.
309. See infra notes 317–20 and accompanying text for discussion of carceral
impact statements.
310. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011) (citing California’s
Corrections Independent Review Panel, appointed by the Governor and
composed of correctional consultants and representatives from state agencies, as
well as the Little Hoover Commission, a bipartisan and independent state body).
311. See id. at 1924–30 (discussing the work of the court appointed Special
Master and the California Prison Health Care Receivership Corporation).
312. See id. at 1924 (citing Governor Schwarzenegger’s emergency
proclamation addressing the overcrowding problem).
313. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE (2010),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/CDCR_Year_At_A_Glance2010
.pdf (providing statistics and trend information about various aspects of
California’s criminal justice system, including adult offenders, juvenile justice, and
recidivism); PAUL GOLASZEWSKI, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT:
REDUCING PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2011), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511.pdf (expressing
concern about the state’s ability to meet the court-ordered deadline through
realignment and suggesting legislative changes to reach those ends).
314. See Driscoll, supra note 162 (discussing a study at Stanford Law School on
the implications of California’s A.B. 109).
315. See, e.g., Safe Communities, Fair Sentences, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safecommunities-fair-sentences-0 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (describing one of the
ACLU’s campaigns); Our Mission, CORRECTIONAL ASS’N N.Y., http://www
.correctionalassociation.org/about/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (“The
Correctional Association of New York is an independent, non-profit organization
founded by concerned citizens in 1844 and granted unique authority by the New
York State Legislature to inspect prisons and to report its findings and
recommendations to the legislature, the public and the press.”).
316. See, e.g., Scott D. Camp, Do Inmate Survey Data Reflect Prison Conditions?
Using Surveys to Assess Prison Conditions of Confinement, 79 PRISON J. 250 (1999),
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/cond
_envir/oreprcamp_pj3.pdf (examining whether inmate survey data can be used
for measures of prison conditions at the group level); Scott D. Camp et al., Using
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sources, the legislature plays the central role in making the best use
of them.
Penal legislation is the result of a process based on supporting
memos, committee reports, transcripts of debates, and other
sources of support or opposition. The legislative history will usually
include some discussion of the effect the laws might have on
society, the crime rate, or individual security, but rarely is a
description of the impact on prison populations or conditions
317
Thus, an effective response to the intolerable
included.
situations created in the prison system might be to require all penal
318
legislation to include an impact assessment.
The federal Prison Impact Assessments law, enacted in 1994,
provides a model to build on: “Any submission of legislation by the
Judicial or Executive branch which could increase or decrease the
number of persons incarcerated in Federal penal institutions shall
be accompanied by a prison impact statement (as defined in
319
Still, critics have pointed out that the law falls
subsection (b)).”
short of its potential because its coverage is limited and there are
320
no remedies for not adhering to it.
To present a current accurate picture of the state of prison
conditions in federal and state institutions, the assessment should
be issued in conjunction with all new penal legislation under review
Inmate Survey Data in Assessing Prison Performance: A Case Study Comparing Private and
Public Prisons, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 26 (2002), available at http://www.bop.gov/news
/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprcamp_cjr.pdf (showing
that inmate surveys can be used to obtain information about prisons, such as safety
and security, sanitation, and gang activity).
317. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change,
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 766–68 (1989) (reviewing the major trends in
criminal legislative reform movements, the author notes that scarcely any attention
was given to the impact of new determinate sentencing laws on prison population
growth).
318. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039, 1101 (2002) (“Under both federal and state law, agencies must file an
‘Environmental Impact Statement’ (EIS) that details the effect of particular
development decisions on the environment. Rules could similarly require
developers to file a ‘Crime Impact Statement’ (CIS) before constructing a large
project.” (footnote omitted)).
319. 18 U.S.C. § 4047(a) (2006); accord MO. REV. STAT. § 217.022(1) (2011)
(requiring prison impact statement for “any legislation” affecting the prison or
parole population numbers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-39 (2011) (requiring
explanatory note for legislation affecting corrections budget).
320. See generally Ronald Goldstock et al., In Our Every Deliberation . . . Time for
Federal Crime Policy Impact Statements, CHAMPION MAG., May 1999, at 18, 20–21 (“We
propose that Congress revise 18 U.S.C. § 4047 to make it applicable to all criminal
justice policy proposals.”).
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and available to participants in the adjudication process. Thus, it
could be more than a financial cost-benefits analysis; it would be a
way to monitor the conditions of confinement and educate
legislators about the effects of new crimes and punishments.
Moreover, it could be an effective tool for reviewing existing laws
that are largely responsible for over-incarceration. The assessment
would serve to help lawmakers and courts adjust prison sentences
to reflect societal values, curb the epidemic of mass imprisonment,
and humanize sentences by taking into account the conditions of
321
confinement.
California’s A.B. 109 is a type of post-assessment legislation,
albeit an assessment driven by litigation, drafted after the prison
problem reached critical mass. And the participants in the state’s
criminal justice system are now fully aware of these circumstances.
Thus, they will be adjudicating cases in a new framework, localizing
punishment, and emphasizing alternatives to incarceration.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision might create a ripple effect
322
throughout the legislatures and criminal justice systems of every
state, compelling legislators, judges, and prosecutors to consider
the outcomes of their choices.
For instance, Professor Adam M. Gershowitz has posited that
increasing prosecutors’ awareness of prison populations, and ergo,
conditions, would have an ameliorating impact on charging
decisions and would result in the reduction of imprisonment
323
He suggests that laws be enacted to require
recommendations.
systematic monitoring and disclosure of prison information.
“Prosecutors should be informed about the total number of
inmates incarcerated, the percentage of prison capacity filled, the
321. Cf. David A. Rossi, Jumping the Gun: Iowa’s Swift Adoption of Minority Impact
Statement Legislation Points to Other Problems Within the State’s Criminal Justice System,
58 DRAKE L. REV. 857 (2010) (examining the purposes and potential problems of
Iowa’s minority impact statement legislation).
322. The “Model Proportionality in Sentencing Act” described in Schneider,
supra note 11, at 30, would complement and supplement California’s realignment,
whose delisting of non-violent, non-serious, non-sex offenders from state prison
sentences is practically a legislative proportionately assessment. The point made
clear by California’s new approach and Schneider’s Model Act is that the
legislature should provide judges with the tools to address the inevitable disparities
in sentencing laws that result in unconstitutional conditions of confinement and
other effects detrimental to society’s welfare and safety. Otherwise, criminal
courts are left to apply their own patchwork proportionate reviews. See id. at 33–
34.
323. Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 47 (2008).
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increase in prison population over the last few years, and whether
any prisons in the jurisdiction are under court supervision because
324
of overcrowding or confinement conditions.”
By inculcating this mentality among prosecutors, it would
increase awareness of the outcomes of prison sentences. It might
even lead to a mandatory review of prison conditions as part of the
presentence investigation, perhaps with input from oversight
agencies. In fact, informing judges, prosecutors, and defendants of
the status of prison life, like a daily stock market report, is in line
with corrections departments’ and law enforcements’ current
reporting duties that provide data for policymakers and
325
researchers.
In an article by Jeffrey Zahler, he suggests that the jury’s right
to exercise its nullification power supports the right to acquit
defendants for whom the sentence would be too harsh and
326
excessive, that is, their vulnerability to certain prison conditions.
Zahler’s thesis is that the jury nullification option could be
exercised on behalf of vulnerable defendants who face prison
327
conditions that would violate the Eighth Amendment. In a sense,
the jury, as the “conscience of the community,” becomes a check
328
In reality, it is
on the limits of punishment and policy making.
not very different from the concept of punitive damages in a civil
329
A huge damages award is intended to send a message
case.
disapproving of one party’s conduct, just as acquitting a defendant
330
due to the harshness of the sentence might do.
Therefore, the jury acquittal becomes the equivalent of an
324. Id. at 50; see, e.g., 2011 Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012)
(providing weekly population figures for prisoners and parolees and an overview
of the state’s plan to reduce its number of inmates).
325. See generally About JRSA, JUST. RES. & STAT. ASS’N, http://www.jrsa.org
/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) ( “[The JRSA] is a national
nonprofit organization of state Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) directors,
researchers, and practitioners throughout government, academia, and criminal
justice organizations dedicated to policy-orientated research and analysis.”).
326. Jeffrey Zahler, Allowing Defendants to Present Evidence of Prison Conditions to
Convince Juries to Nullify: Can Only the Prosecutor Present “Moral” Evidence?, 34 N.E. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 485, 516 (2008).
327. Id. at 502–09.
328. Id. at 516.
329. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in
Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 325 (2011).
330. See Studnicki, supra note 220.
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Eighth Amendment injunction against harsh sentences for
vulnerable people based on prison conditions. The possibility that
jury nullifications based on prison conditions might spark
legislative or judicial reform suggests an approach from the ground
up similar to the model suggested for amending the Federal
331
The impetus for reform could be fueled
Sentencing Guidelines.
by recognizing that court-applied exceptions to incarcerative
sentences and jury acquittals are only substitutes for improving
conditions within the penal system. In other words, more
exceptions found by judges and a growing number of not-guilty
verdicts by jurors would indicate where changes are needed in the
332
Thus, those who work in the trenches of
criminal justice system.
daily practice might find safety valves to forestall upticks in
incarceration well ahead of the next crisis.
VII. CONCLUSION
333

Prisons are filled with “representatives of humanity.”
The
Supreme Court reminded us of this when they decided that the
evils resulting from overcrowding were unconstitutional and ought
to be remedied by an order to reduce California’s prison
334
335
The majority was so appalled that they took the
population.
336
rare step of including photographs of the horrendous living
conditions in two of the prisons and the cage used for detaining
prisoners while treating for mental illness. And California has
rolled out a virtually new criminal justice system to stem the flow of
331. See Zahler, supra note 326, at 509–10.
332. Id. at 514–15.
If evidence of prison conditions is admitted in criminal trials, and the
acquittal rate rises dramatically, society will have a much greater incentive
to reform the prison system. If prison conditions are so revolting that
adequately informed juries are not willing to incarcerate otherwise guilty
defendants, the solution should be to fix the problems with prisons. The
alternative solution currently used, which is to hide the problems in the
hope that juries can be tricked into incarcerating people who they would
not choose to condemn if they had more information, is not a solution
that any society should be proud of.
Id.
333. See Henry, supra note 190, at 202 (describing the concept of “equality as
dignity”).
334. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011).
335. It is notable that there were no concurring opinions, which indicates
solidarity on the reasoning and approach to prisoners’ rights by five of the justices.
Id. at 1947.
336. Id. at app. B & C.
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non-violent offenders and technical parole violators into state
prison and at the same time raised the cache of alternatives to
incarceration. Overall, the Court’s decision was a tocsin for every
337
jurisdiction with prison populations at the boiling point.
The exceptions to incarcerative sentences highlight the
problems with their overuse. The risk of harm and sexual assault;
the deleterious impact on the elderly, infirm, and mentally
challenged; and a host of other factors already discussed have
justified in individual cases amelioration of the immutable prison
option. The catalog of prison-induced harm found in the Supreme
Court’s decision, the body of penal laws that have been repealed,
338
the sentences vacated, and the prison conditions declared “cruel
339
are a testament to the need for reform.
and unusual”
Unconstitutional confinement cannot be tolerated or sanitized out
of convenience, political/economic necessity, or tradition. Neither
the passage of time nor the intensity of public opinion can make a
340
The development of prisons into precincts of abuse
virtue of it.
is the result of indifference, insensitivity, and collective
337. See, e.g., Kurt Erickson, Illinois Could Face California-Style Prison Meltdown,
Experts Say, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:03 PM), http://qctimes.com/news
/local/article_c3390cb4-cebe-11e0-b9c3-001cc4c03286.html.
In response to
Illinois’s rising prison population, around 137 percent of capacity, the solution at
the forefront is to recalculate the available space.
Instead of using an industry standard based on the number of cells, the
state is now measuring capacity based on how many beds can fit in a
facility. . . . [Rebekah] Evenson [the attorney involved in the California
lawsuit] said recalculating capacity based on bed space is ‘very, very
irresponsible’ because it could lead to numerous problems.
Id.
338. See generally Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Length of Sentence as Violation of
Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3D 335 §
2[a] (1970).
339. See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Prison Conditions as
Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3D 111 § 2[a] (1973).
340. See generally CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL
ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD NONSERIOUS
OFFENDERS AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (2009), available at
http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2009_focus_nonserious_offenders.pdf
(discussing the Zogby survey that revealed that most people were in favor of
alternatives to incarceration for non-violent, non-serious crime); Douglas A.
Berman, “Should Sentences Reflect the Will of the Public?,” SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG,
(Oct. 12, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and
_policy/2011/10/should-sentences-reflect-the-will-of-the-public.html
(“In
his
tough questioning of USSC Chair Judge Patti Saris, Rep. Gowdy suggested he
would favor having Congress ‘codify’ the guidelines via statutes (which would, of
course, require jury findings of all aggravating factors based on Apprendi/Blakely).
Rep. Gowdy also noted that some states have jury sentencing.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/4

60

Strutin: The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing Reform an

2012] THE REALIGNMENT OF INCARCERATIVE PUNISHMENT

1373

341

forgetting.
Indeed, this article is only part of the ongoing
dialogue reappraising plea and sentencing practices and modes of
342
punishment that have led society to this point.
The very existence of the prison system desensitizes people to
343
cruelty and promotes indifference to suffering. Furthermore, the
practice of incarcerating millions cuts a swath through
communities across the nation and through the living fabric of tens
of millions of families. Our current system provides a perpetual
guarantee that an indelible segment of the populace will be tagged
with a chronic social disease caused by debilitating isolation and
mistreatment. The time has come for the collective genius behind
American justice to abandon this failed approach and invent a new,
344
And that
humane direction for our system of punishment.
341. These three facets of human nature are responsible at once for the
survival of cruelty in our lives and institutions, or, as William Blake put it, “Cruelty
has a human heart.” William Blake, A Divine Image in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE (1789), available at http://www.online-literature.com/blake/songs-ofinnocence-and-experie/43/. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT:
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007); People ‘Still Willing to
Torture,’ BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008, 10:41 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/health/7791278.stm (discussing new American experiments validating the
Milgram test about the willingness of ordinary people to inflict pain on others due
to social pressure); Philip G. Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment Slide Tour: An
End to the Experiment, STAN. PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org
/psychology/37 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (discussing why the experiment was
terminated early).
342. See Mary Ellen Mastrorilli, Replacing “Hard Cells” With “Soft Cells”: A
Hard Sell for Criminal Justice Policy Makers (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881084; Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the
Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS (3d ed., 2010), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice
_section_newsletter/crimjust_policy_midyear2010_102i.authcheckdam.pdf
(advising the legal profession and judiciary on correctional practices).
343. See John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney—New Answers
to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 329 (1980) (“Those guilty of serious crimes
merit the wrath of our society. But almost no one deserves the hell holes that we
call jails and prisons. There is almost no case I would not defend if that meant
keeping a human being, as condemnable as he or she may be, from suffering the
total, brutal inhumanity of our jails and prisons.”); David Brooks, Let’s All Feel
Superior, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15
/opinion/brooks-lets-all-feel-superior.html (“Some people simply can’t process
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Normalcy Bias. When they find themselves in some unsettling circumstance, they
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344. See, e .g., Nicola Abé, Doing Time on Norway’s Island Prison, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist
/0,1518,744851,00.html (describing a Norwegian prison that “emphasizes self-
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realignment begins with full disclosure about and full
consideration of the present conditions of confinement and their
consequences.
It is the unconstitutionality of prison conditions, made evident
by Eighth Amendment claims, which compels new policies seeking
sentence reductions and alternatives to incarceration. Without a
policy making the conditions of confinement transparent,
345
Once
constitutional justice will be observed only in the breach.
lawmakers, adjudicators, and advocates are made aware of the
conditions of confinement and their effects, the trip hammer of
346
carceral punishment might not fall as swiftly.
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